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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-PASSED
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS
by
MARTIN E. LATZ*
Few issues in American politics have the potential to change the political
landscape as dramatically as term limits. Term limits restrict the number of terms
elected officials may remain in office. The forced retirement of leaders in Congress
and state legislatures across the country may bring a new generation of officials to
our political arena. Rarely have topics with such enormous potential impact been
favored by 70'percent of the American electorate.' It should be no surprise that in
1990 term limit measures passed for the first time in this nation's history in
California, Colorado, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Utah.2 Term limit
supporters are currently organizing all over the country to get this issue placed on
statewide ballots. Supporters point to grass-roots organizations active in 35 states.'
Likely battlegrounds in 1992 include Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Ohio
and Oregon and Washington.4
Colorado is the only state currently imposing congressional term limits.
Colorado's voters passed a state constitutional amendment in November, 1990,
limiting the terms of their U.S. members of Congress. Senators were restricted to
serving two consecutive terms, while Colorado's members of the U.S. House of
Representatives may now only serve six consecutive terms.5
A multitude of problems arise when states pass constitutional amendments or
laws limiting the terms of their federal representatives. This article focuses only on
the U.S. constitutional issue. Does a state law limiting the number of terms its
federal representatives may serve violate the U.S. Constitution?6
"Harvard Law School, Class of 1992. Mr. Latz will be joining the law firm of Lewis & Roca in Phoenix,
Arizona staring in the fall of 1992. Mr. Latz graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison with a B.A. in Political Science in 1987 and also has a degree from the London School of
Ecomomics in 1986.
' Gallup Poll, December 1989
2 California, Colorado, and Oklahoma passed initiatives limiting the terms of their state representatives.
South Dakota and Utah passed resolutions calling for a Constitutional Amendment to limit Congressional
terms. Kansas City, Missouri and San Jose, California passed laws limiting the terms of their city
councilmembers.
3 Glasser, Advocates of Congressional Term Limits PUshfor Votes in Ariz., Wash., Ohio, Fla., ROL CALL,
Feb. 14, 1991.4 1d.
5 The Colorado amendment defines terms as consecutive "unless they are at least four years apart." CoLO.
CoNsr. amend. V.
6 Current efforts to pass a constitutional amendment limiting congressional terms will not be addressed in
this paper. However, eight different constitutional amendments limiting members' terms had been
introduced in the 102nd Congress as of February 14, 1991. Few observers, however, expect any of these
measures to move out of the judiciary committees.
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In Part I, this article explores the underlying policy debate surrounding this
issue.7 Our Founding Fathers debated variations of these arguments in the Consti-
tutional Convention. Academics and political columnists are currently tackling this
issue in the popular press. Part II examines the debate over whether to allocate the
power to limit congressional terms to each individual state instead of to the federal
government (through a constitutional amendment or federal law). Part III investi-
gates potential constitutional challenges based on the qualification and election
clauses in the Constitution. Finally, Part IV addresses possible first amendment free
speech and fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges to state-passed
congressional term limits.
PART I: POLICY ARGUMENTS UNDERLYING THE DEBATE
ABOUT TERM LIMITATIONS
Term limit activists defy ideological pigeonholes. While Republicans largely
support term limits, 37 years of continuous Democratic control of the U.S. House
of Representative provides ample incentive for supporting measures which may
break up this stranglehold on Congress. Democrats also control most state
legislatures.8 Term limit supporters are markedly anti-incumbent, not strictly
partisan. 9 As Thomas E. Cronin, a political scientist at Colorado College states, the
term limit movement is generally "anti-politician, anti-establishment, anti-taxes,
and anti-Washington, D.C."10  A quick survey of term limit supporters and
opponents bears this out. "Conservative" President George Bush and Vice-
President Dan Quayle support term limits. "Liberal" Democrats like newly elected
U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota, Governor Ann Richards of Texas, and
U.S. Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota, however, join the President and Vice-
President on this side of the term limit fence. "Conservative" Bruce Fein, however,
opposes term limits. Noted "Conservative" columnist George F. Will initially
opposed term limits, but now supports them. There are powerful arguments and
prominent Republicans and Democrats on both sides.
Term limit proponents lament the state of a representative democracy that
reelects congressional incumbents at excessive rates. Ninety-six percent of incum-
7 Term limitations imposed on state or city elected officials may also be subject to constitutional challenge.
This will not be analyzed here. Potential state constitutional challenges to term limit laws are also outside
the scope of this paper. Some of this analysis may, however, apply equally to any term limit measure.
8 Americans to Limit Congressional Terms (ALCT) was founded and is run out of republican consultant
Eddie Mahe's office. Term limits were also part of the 1988 Republican party platform. All but three co-
sponsors in the U.S. Senate of the measure limiting terms to 12 years are Republicans. As Michael Kinsley
writes, it is "basically an expression of Republican frustration at the Democratic dominance of Congress
over the past few decades" Kinsley, IRB: Voters in Chains, The New Republic, Apr. 2, 1990, at 4.
9 One cautionary note for Republicans - the 22nd Amendment drive limiting the number of Presidential
terms to two was spearheaded by Republican support in response to Democratic President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's four terms in office. It's effect, however, has been to preclude two popular republican
Presidents - Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan - from potentially being elected to third terms.
" Cronin, Term Limits--a Symptom, NotA Cure, The N.Y. Times, Dec. 23,1990, at E 11, col. 1.
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bent members of the U.S. House of Representatives who ran in 1990 were
reelected.1 In 1988,98.3 percent were reelected; (Out of 409 incumbents who ran
for re-election, only six were defeated). Eighty-five percent of incumbents received
more than 60 percent of the vote in their districts in 1988, and the average incumbent
received 73.5 percent of the vote. Sixty-three members were returned with
majorities exceeding 94 percent. 2 Term limit supporters contend that voters do not
have viable choices. They state that our democratic system needs drastic reform.
Term limits will return real choices and competition between candidates and ideas
to the voters, where they belong. Voters need real choices in order for our
representative democracy to function effectively.
Term limit supporters also stress that term limits will dramatically increase
turnover in Congress. Congressional newcomers will inject fresh blood and new
ideas into our democratic system. Our democratic system, they argue, is currently
stagnant with leaders who have spent more than half their lives in the halls of
Congress and who are rarely challenged in elections. The country will be better
served by foreclosing Congress as a permanent professional career and opening up
Washington, D.C., to a regular influx of new citizen-legislators. Increased turnover
will lead to a more responsive, varied, and democratic Congress. Thomas Jefferson
agreed, stating "The second feature I dislike [about the Constitution], and strongly
dislike, is the abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office."' 3
Many Founding Fathers feared the "professional" legislator. Term limit supporters
see professional legislators as constituting the current majority in Congress.14
Term limit opponents respond by analyzing the actual percentage turnover in
Congress. While the congressional reelection rate of 90-plus percent is indeed high,
there has been a nearly two-thirds turnover in Congress in the last twelve years."5
During Ronald Reagan's presidency, 55 percent of the House of Representatives
turned over, and since 1974, 81 percent of the House was replaced by "new blood".
Average seniority in the House in 1971 was six terms (only twelve years); in 1990
it was 5.8.16 These percentages reveal significant turnover in Congress.
" A recent study by David C. Huckabee of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress
concluded that this number has remained in the 90s ever since 1974. The study also noted that this
percentage is currently the highest it has ever been since the middle of President Washington's first term.
This number in the 19th Century hovered between 40 and 70 percent (even hitting as low as 24 percent in
1842). It hit the 70s after World War I and has been steadily rising ever since.
12 Hertzberg, Twelve is Enough: A Simple Cure For Chronic Incumbency: Limiting Congressional Terms,
Tim NEw Rs Puuc, Volume 202, Number 20, May 14, 1990, at 22. In 1990, 74 house members and 4
senators ran unopposed. (Fifty-six house members were unopposed in 1988.)
11 Thomas Jefferson, as quoted by Edward H. Crane, Should Terms of Political Officeholders be Limited?,
GA;emrr NEws SERviat, American Forum, September 30, 1990. Mandatory rotation of Members of
Congress was required in the Continental Congress. A limit of three years service in any six years was
imposed.
"
4 Kessler, Bad Housekeeping: The Case Against Congressional Term Limitations, TYM HEMrrAcE FOUNDA-
TON Policy Review, Summer 1990.
'5 Cronin, supra note 10.6Will, Is 18 Years On The Hill Enough?. The Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1990, B 7, col. 6.
Summer, 1991]
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Further, the U.S. Senate experienced only about a 70 percent reelection rate
over the last 50 years.17 This guarantees significant turnover." If proponents' stated
goal is increased turnover in Congress, and the danger to be avoided is stagnation,
no such problem exists. Opponents also point out that re-election rate percentages
overstate the likelihood incumbents will remain in Congress. Incumbents expecting
to lose tend to retire. In 1986, six senators out of thirty-three with terms ending and
more than fifty representatives decided not seek office. 19 The likelihood of loss
might have been a factor in these incumbents' decision not to seek re-election.
Term limit opponents foresee dangerous consequences should congressional
term limits pass. They foresee the forced loss of valuable experienced legislators just
when they are becoming most effective. The business of state and federal
government has grown increasingly complex. Expertise and experience in govern-
ment has become proportionately more valuable. 2° Both supporters and opponents
recognize this cost. They differ, however, in assessing the value of the loss of
particular members.
Opponents also contend term limits will transfer power to non-legislative and
non-elective actors. Nelson W. Polsby, the director of the Institute of Governmental
Studies at the University of California - Berkeley, notes:
Term limitations throw away the benefits of learning from experience. Inex-
perienced legislators are less powerful in relation to legislative staff, executive
branch bureaucrats and interest group lobbyists from who they must learn the
customs and routines of legislative operations and the stories behind policy
proposals. New people in any complex institution are highly dependent on the
people around them. Term limitations just shift power from elected officials
to the relatively inaccessible officials, bureaucrats and influence peddlers
who surround them.21
Opponents note this transfer of power undercuts the essence of democracy. No
longer will policymakers be responsive to the public.
Supporters do not believe members of Congress are currently very responsive
to the public. They further argue that limiting the tenure of legislative staff and
increased turnover in Congress will decrease the value of lobbyists' contacts.
Opponents respond that these measures have costs. Dedicated and experienced
career public servants would be lost. Nationally syndicated political analyst Mark
Shields writes that by further limiting legislative and staff terms, you put power
' Becker, Reforming Congress: Why Limiting Terms Won't Work, Busnmss WEEK, Aug. 6, 1990, at 18.
"Id.
19 Id.
" Wicker, The Best Revenge, The N.Y. Times, June 11, 1990, at A19, cd. 5 states "[t]he increasing
complexity of legislation requires expertise and experience, which would be limited as well as terms." Id
2 Polsby, Perspectives on Term Limitations, The Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 1990, (emphasis added).
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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"[flight in the grubby, grabby hands of Washington lobbies and lawyers.... They
would be the prime repositories of information and knowledge."'
Supporters dispute this, contending that the current impact of money and
special interest group politics on bur elective process largely removes citizens from
effectively exercising their votes. Terms limits will minimize the influence of
money and special interest groups on politics by decreasing the relevance of money
to incumbents. Incumbents will have less incentive to amass huge war chests if they
can only serve a limited number of terms. Special interest groups and lobbyists'
influence will decrease as incumbents will not be forced to rely to such a great extent
on big fundraisers and special interest money.
Opponents challenge the accuracy of this conclusion. Money, in their view,
will matter as long as members of Congress may serve more than one term.
Opponents contend that interest groups' play critical roles in our democratic system.
Despite the rhetoric of the 1984 Presidential campaign which castigated Former
Vice President Mondale for his alleged dependence on interest groups, such groups
still represent millions of citizens' views before Congress, and lobby for such views
in an organized and effective manner. This is one way our system assures that the
voice of many different people and organizations will be heard.
Term limit opponents most powerful argument, however, is that term limits
deny voters one of the most basic and fundamental rights in our country: the right
to vote for a representative of one's choice. Voters who believe extended incum-
bency undermines our democratic system are free to vote against their particular
incumbents. Denying other voters the right to choose a particular candidate whom
they have chosen many times before, forcing incumbents to prematurely retire, is
inherently undemocratic. Our system of representative democracy rests on citizens
choosing their representatives. Term limit opponents trust in voters to make the best
choice. Former President Gerald Ford noted that he would rather put his trust in
voters than in an "abstract, indiscriminate rule like a 12 year limitation."23 Former
President Jimmy Carter also responded, noting in a talk at New York University in
December 1990 that "[t]he ultimate authority in this country is the collective will of
the American people."24 Polsby agrees. 5
Supporters respond by underscoring their assertion that there is no real choice
22 Shields, Limiting Terms in Congress Will Only Make Things Worse, NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 1989.
" Wicker, supra note 20.
4 Wicker, On the Bandwagon, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1990, at E 15, col. 5.
" He argues that "term limitations won't enhance representative democracy. Just the opposite, since they
create an artificial barrier preventing voters from returning to office legislators they might otherwise favor.
Why are we so certain that voters have such terrible judgment that they need a constitutional restriction
keeping them from voting for incumbents they know and like? It is hard to see how restricting voters'
alternatives in this arbitrary way can be proposed in the name of representative government or democracy."
Polsby, supra note 21.
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LiMrrsSummer, 19911
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in a system that re-elects House incumbents at a 98.5 percent rate. They focus on
the meaning of "choice." As Mark B. Liedl of The Heritage Foundation states,
Is [choice] the ability to vote for a particular person or the ability to vote for
a set of ideas and values? The heart of voting is really the latter-to vote for
someone who shares your beliefs. Limiting terms does not restrict that
fundamental choice. It limits voters' ability to pick a particular person, but not
their ability to elect congressmen who share their policy views.26
Supporters also point out that Presidential terms were limited by the 22nd
amendment, which restricts voters' right to vote for Presidents who have already
served two terms. Congressional term limits impose the same restriction on a state's
members of Congress. The country saw fit to restrict the terms of its sole national
representative, the President.27 States should have the power to restrict the terms of
its representatives, its members of Congress. Members of Congress serve the need
of their state's citizens, not the citizens of other states. If a state's citizens want to
restrict theirmember's terms, they should have the ability to do so. Many arguments
made against congressional term limits could also have been made against passage
of the 22nd amendment.
Opponents reply that it is significant that the measure limiting presidential
terms is a constitutional amendment. The process by which the Constitution is
amended is more onerous than each state passing separate laws restricting the
number of terms forits members of Congress. The Presidency is also a federal office,
as are members of Congress. No state action should be able to restrict the number
of terms for federal elected officials.
Supporters assert that term limits will create incentives for Congressmen to
focus on national policy issues instead of constituent casework. Constituent
operations compose a time-consuming and unproductive aspect of congressional
service. By efficiently serving constituent needs, members of Congress help ensure
their return to Washington, D.C., but accomplish little else. Term limits would
significantly diminish the value of this part of congressional service, freeing
members to focus on policy.
Opponents respond by questioning the assumption that constituent service
harms our democratic system. Opponents view constituent operations as the essence
of responsiveness to the electorate. Further, members of Congress will still desire
to be reelected even if term limits are enacted. They will continue to act in ways that
assure them a better chance of reelection, and if constituent service accomplishes
26Liedl, Heritage Foundation Reports, Nov. 10, 1990.
27 The Vice-President is also a national representative, but he/she is elected on the same ticket as the
President. The 22nd amendment in effect limits particular tickets' terms, although presumably a vice-
president may serve consecutively under different Presidents.
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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this, there is no compelling reason to limit it. Opponents also stress that members
of Congress currently focus a great deal on national policy issues. This is especially
true in the U.S. Senate, where Senators are up for reelection only once every six
years. If members of the House of Representatives put greater focus on "national"
issues and less on "parochial" needs of their constituents, the basic rationale for
creating a separate House and Senate would be lost - that is, stricter accountability
to the electorate.
Supporters emphasize that term limits will reinvigorate political parties by
limiting the strength of individual members of Congress. As Hendrik Hertzberg in
The New Republic notes,
[b]y routinely undermining the totally independent, totally personal power
bases that long serving [S]enators and [R]epresentatives are able to build and
maintain under the current system, and by dramatically increasing the number
of elections fought on the basis of national issues, the term limit would
enhance the strength and coherence of both national parties.28
Term limit supporters believe stronger national political parties will result in a more
effective democratic system.
Proponents further believe that the pervasive and undemocratic rule of
seniority which infects Congress will be a major victim of term limits. As Hertzberg
argues,
The House Speaker, the chairmen of important committees, and the other
potentates of Congress have long been elevated by a decades-long, quasi-
feudal process of favor-trading, personal alliance-building, ladder-climbing,
and "getting along by going along." The term limits would leave Congress
little choice but to elect its chiefs democratically, on the basis of the policies
and the leadership qualities of the candidates. 29
Term limit opponents respond by reiterating the point that term limits remove
experienced legislators. There is a great deal of evidence that the strict seniority
structure has been in a state of deterioration over the past twenty years. The system
has undergone substantial reform since the early 1970s, much of which has already
undermined the seniority systemY°
Supporters respond by stating that good, experienced legislators will not be
removed from the system by term limits. Instead, term limits will increase
I Hertzberg, supra note 12, at 26.
2 Id. at 24.
1 The Class of 1974 and the subsequent reform of the committee structure with the advent of numerous and
powerful subcommittees and subcommittee chairs is one example of this phenomenon. Committee
chairmen are also now elected by secret ballot.
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITSSummer, 1991]
7
Latz: Congressional Term Limits
Publish d by IdeaExchang @UAkron, 1992
competition for elective office as members "forced" out of office would seek other
elective offices. The more competition, the better our democracy will function.
Voters will be faced with more and varied choices, and experienced legislators will
continue to provide their expertise for the public good.
Proponents also emphasize the fact that many government bureaucrats
currently are more responsive to Congress than the executive branch because of the
extended tenure of most members of Congress. Bureaucrats are less responsive to
the President because the 22nd amendment limits Presidential terms and increases
turnover in the executive branch. Term limits will restore the Presidency to its proper
place and restore the intended balance of power between the two branches of
government.
Opponents, however, respond that the Presidency is already too powerful.
Our Founding Fathers never intended the executive branch to wield the power with
which it is currently endowed. Passage of the New Deal and other reforms
essentially created the administrative state and shattered the balance between the two
branches of government. Opponents believe term limits will exacerbate this
problem.
Irrespective of whether one supports or oppose term limits for members of
Congress, the constitutional issue looms. In the next part, I examine the potential
danger of giving states, as opposed to the federal government, the power to limit
congressional terms. Colorado exercised this power in November, 1990, by
amending their state constitution to limit congressional terms.' Proponents in other
states hope to follow in their footsteps.
PART II: METHODS To LIMIT TERMS
Congressional term limit supporters are organizing about 35 states across the
country to place this issue on ballots on election day. Efforts may proceed on three
fronts to pass Congressional term limits. Two types of efforts are subject to
constitutional challenge. Advocates may press for a constitutional amendment
limiting congressional terms. 32 Currently, there has been no action in Congress
outside the judiciary committees. South Dakota and Utah, however, have passed
resolutions calling for a constitutional amendment limiting congressional terms.
31 Colorado amended its constitution to limit the term of its federal representatives CoLo. CONST. amend V.
Most of the analysis and decisions in this paper address state statutes. This distinction does not significantly
impact the analysis in this paper, for any state action that violates the U.S. Constitution will be held invalid,
regardless if it was a state statute or state constitutional amendment.
32 The U.S. Constitution may be amended one of two ways. First, two-thirds of each house of Congress may
vote to send to the states a proposed constitutional amendment. In order for it to be enacted, three-quarters
of the states' legislatures must then pass the proposed constitutional amendment. Second, two-thirds of the
states may force Congress call a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments. The convention's
proposed amendments, however, still need to be ratified by three-quarters of the states.
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW R~vimw
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/4
Amending the constitution is burdensome. In our country's 215 years of existence,
only 26 Amendments have been ratified (and only 16 since 1791 - when the Bill of
Rights was ratified). Term limit activists view amending the constitution as the most
difficult route.
Activists may also pressure Congress to pass a law limiting congressional
terms. Term limit activists also believe relying on Congress to voluntarily limit their
own terms is highly unlikely. This avenue raises some of the same constitutional
issues as state-passed initiatives.
State-passed initiatives are the most popular activist route. Congresonal
term limit supporters organize states to place term limit proposals directly on ballots.
An initiative was placed on the Colorado ballot in November, 1990. Activists in 35
states hope to place term limits on state ballots using this route in November, 1992.
The next section examines the proposition that qualifications may only be
added by amending the U.S. Constitution.
PART III: CONSTrrtrIONAL IssuES
The constitutional debate surrounding state-passed congressional term limits
revolves around three constitutional provisions. Term limit activists urge different
interpretations of the various clauses to support their respective viewpoints. The first
critical provision, Article I, Sections 2 and 3, sets forth qualifications without which
an individual may not serve in the United States Congress:
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of
twenty five Years, and been seven years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall
be chosen3 and,
[n]o Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen
("qualifications clauses").
Term limit opponents primarily rely on this provision for the major constitu-
tional challenge to term limit laws. They assert that the qualifications clauses
enumerate exclusive qualifications for members of Congress. Attempts to add to or
take away from these enumerated qualifications by Congress or the states are
unconstitutional. Term limits are an added qualification. Therefore, term limits may
only be enacted by amending the Constitution.
33 U.S. Co Nsr. art. I, § 2.
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
CONGRESIONAL TERM LimrrsSummer, 1991 ]
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The second critical constitutional provision in this debate, Article I, Section
4, ("state regulation clause") states:
[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.35
Supporters of state-passed congressional term limits depend on this clause for the
Proposition that term limits do not add qualifications for membership in Congress.
Term limits are simply another measure whereby states regulate congressional
elections. The state regulation clause grants states this power.
Finally, Article I, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution states that "[e]ach house
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Mem-
bers'. . ." ("judging clause"). Congress relies on this clause to "judge the qualifi-
cations" of particular members in determining whether to seat them in Congress
("Exclusion Cases"). Most commentary and court decisions addressing the issue of
what constitutes a "qualification" for congressional office do so in the context of
exclusion cases. The question whether term limits are additional "qualifications"
distinguishes the two sides in this debate. One's conclusion rests on whether one
primarily focuses on the qualifications clauses or the state regulation clause.
Three questions must be examined to ascertain the effect of these constitu-
tional provisions on state-passed congressional term limits. May Congress or any
of the individual states constitutionally impose additional "qualifications" for office
upon individuals wishing to become (or remain) members of Congress absent
amending the Constitution? What constitutes an additional "qualification"? Fi-
nally, are term limits additional "qualifications"?
Neither Congress nor states may add qualifications for membership in
Congress to those currently enumerated in the Constitution.
Whether Congress or states may add qualifications to those enumerated in the
Constitution without amending it has been extensively debated in Congress, the
courts, and in the academic community. The United States Supreme Court faced this
issue in Powell v. McCormack.37 While the Powell Court never defines "qualifica-
tions", its analysis and conclusions pertaining to the qualifications clauses provide
the basis for understanding term limit opponents' argument that such measures may
only be enacted by amending the Constitution. The Powell holding serves as the
foundation for subsequent Supreme Court decisions affecting the definition of
"qualifications."
3s U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4.
3U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
3 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.486 (1969).
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Petitioner Adam Clayton Powell was reelected to the United States House of
Representatives from the 18th Congressional District in New York in 1966.
Pursuant to a House resolution based on the judging clause of the Constitution,
Congress refused to seat Powell. This refusal was predicated on a House special
subcommittee report that concluded Powell had deceived the House of Represen-
tatives concerning certain travel expenses and had directed illegal salary payments
to his wife while serving as Chair of the House Education and Labor Committee.
Powell filed suit against House Speaker John McCormack and others alleging the
House unconstitutionally refused to seat him. Powell argued that the House could
refuse to seat him only if he failed to satisfy the three standing qualifications
enumerated in the qualification clause of the Constitution. He satisfied the age,
citizenship, and residency requirements specified in this clause. Powell asserted the
House action as a result was unconstitutional.
The House's refusal in Powell to seat a duly elected member of Congress
forced the Supreme Court to interpret the judging clause of the Constitution.38 The
Powell Court found it necessary to exhaustively review the historical materials
surrounding the passage of both the judging clause and the qualifications clauses in
its analysis. This decision provides the most clear and unambiguous U.S. Supreme
Court holding regarding both clauses in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court faced a variety of constitutional issues in Powell. The
critical question regarding term limits rested on the Court's extensive historical
analysis underlying the inclusion in the U.S. Constitution of the qualifications
clauses. Respondent McCormack raised the "qualifications" issue by arguing that
the case presented a political question and was nonjusticiable. He contended that
there was a"'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment' to the House of the
'adjudicatory power' to determine Powell's qualifications. Thus [McCormack]...
'argued thatthe House, and the House alone, has powerto determine who is qualified
to be a member."'3 9 The Powell Court embarked on a comprehensive effort to
"determine what power the Constitution confers upon the House through Art. I, § 5
[judging clause]..." and whether it includes the power to add qualifications to those
explicitly enumerated in the qualifications clauses. 10
The Supreme Court concluded, after analyzing cases starting with a 16th
Century British Parliament case, that their "examination of the relevant historical
materials leads us [the Court] to the conclusion that petitioners [Powell...] are
correct and that the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any
person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for
3 tJustice Stewart's dissent contends that this constitutionalissue need not have been addressed by the Court.
He relies on a different interpretation of findings earlier addressed by the Court. Id at 56D (Stewart, J.
dissenting)
39 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 519.
40 Id.
CONOREssiONAL TERm LunTSummer, 1991]
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membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." 4' These requirements
include those explicitly stated in the qualifications clauses (age, citizenry, and
residency requirements). The Powell Court found that Congress could not consider
outside criteria and qualifications in addition to those "expressly prescribed" in the
Constitution in determining whether or not to seat a member under the judging
clause.42
This conclusion underlies the argument that because term limits are additional
"qualifications", one may only add them by amending the Constitution. It is
important to examine the relevant historical materials in light of whether term limits
constitute an additional qualification to those enumerated in the qualifications
clauses. Also, the Powell Court's holding as it applies to the Colorado measure, may
be limited because it did not directly resolve the issue of whether Congress or a state
may explicitly add a qualification for office. However, while the Powell Court did
not directly address the qualifications clauses in that context, its historical examina-
tion of the debates leading up to their inclusion in the Constitution makes this
distinction less relevant.
1. Powell v. McCormack's Historical Analysis of the
Qualifications Clauses
The Powell Court analyzed English and colonial exclusion cases dating back
to a House of Commons declaration in 1553, which excluded a clergyman from his
seat in the House. The Court concluded that "[b]y 1782, after a long struggle, the
arbitrary exercise of the power to exclude was unequivocally repudiated by a House
of Commons resolution which ended the most notorious English election dispute of
the 18th century, the John Wilkes case."43 Wilkes, while serving in Parliament, had
published an attack on a peace treaty with France in unusually harsh language. The
House of Commons consequently expelled him. Wilkes, however, regained his seat
by popular vote years later. He also convinced the House to expunge the previous
House action expelling him. The action previously expelling him was finally
denounced as "subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this
kingdom."4 The case stood for the proposition that the voters (electors) rights were
paramount and the House of Commons did not have the power to exclude those duly
elected by the public.
41 Id., Powell Footnote 44 states "Since Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, applies to both Houses of Congress, the scope of
the Senate's power to judge the qualifications of its members necessarily is identical to the scope of the
House's power, with the exception, of course, that Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, establishes different age and citizenship
requirements for membership in the Senate." Id.
42 395 U.S. at 548.
43 Id. at 527.
4Id. at 528, (quoting 22 Parl. I-ist. Eng. 1411 (1782)).
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The Powell Court used the case involving Wilkes to note:
[w]ith the successful resolution of Wilkes' long and bitter struggle for the right
of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice, it is
evident that, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English precedent
stood for the proposition that 'the law of the land had regulated the qualifica-
tions of members to serve in parliament' and the qualifications were 'not
occasional but fixed'. 45
Great Britain concluded that the House of Commons was without the power
to exclude members based on any criteria other than standing qualifications. This
view protected voters' fundamental rights to choose whom they wished to represent
them, for the House was without the arbitrary power to deny seats from voters' duly
elected representatives.
Voters' fundamental right to choose is the strongest policy argument against
term limits. This right also provides the crucial rationale in arguing why qualifica-
tions enumerated in the Constitution should be fixed and subject only to change by
amending the Constitution. The Wilkes case stood for this right in the American
colonies prior to the Constitutional convention. The Powell Court stressed:
Wilkes' struggle and his ultimate victory had a significant impact in the
American colonies. His advocacy of libertarian causes and his pursuit of the
right to be seated in Parliament became a cause celebre for the colonists....
It is within this historical context that we must examine the Convention
debates in 1787, just five years after Wilkes' final victory."
Before examining the Convention debates, however, the Supreme Court noted
that petitioners (Powell...) relied heavily on constitutional scholar Charles War-
ren's analysis in arguing that the Constitutional Convention "proceedings manifest
the Framers' unequivocal intention to deny either branch of Congress the authority
to add to or otherwise vary the membership qualifications expressly set forth in the
Constitution."47 While the Powell Court stated that "[w]e do not completely agree
[with this proposition], for the debates are subject to other interpretations. . .", it
concludes:
the records of the debates, viewed in the context of the bitter struggle for the
right to freely choose representatives which had recently concluded in
England and in light of the distinction the Framers made between the power
to expel and the power to exclude, indicate that petitioners' ultimate conclu-
sion in correct.48
45 d.
"Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 530-31.
47 Id. at 532; see C. WARnN, ThE MAKG oF nm CoNsrmmoN (1937).
4 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 53. The power to expel was separately provided for in U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 2. It states that a member can only be expelled by a vote of two-thirds of the house in which the
member sits.
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The Supreme Court indicated that the constitutional debates were subject to
other interpretations. These alternate interpretations underlie some of term limit
supporters' arguments. However, the Supreme Court adopted and relied upon
substantial portions of Charles Warren's analysis in their opinion. This necessitates
a brief recitation of Warren's conclusion.
Charles Warren in his seminal work on the Constitution concluded that neither
the Houses of Congress nor the states had been granted "the right to establish any
qualifications for its members, other than those qualifications established by the
Constitution itself, viz., age, citizenship, and residence." 49 He emphasized that
"[tihe elimination of all power in Congress to fix qualifications clearly left the
provisions of the Constitution itself as the sole source of qualifications." Warren's
conclusions primarily rest on his examination of the debate in the Constitutional
Convention over whether to add property qualifications to those already enumerated
in the qualifications clauses.51
James Madison played the crucial role in this debate, which took place on
August 10, 1787.52 Madison led the fight against giving Congress the power to
regulate its own qualifications. He argued that granting Congress this power would
place "an improper and dangerous power in the Legislature," and noted that the
qualifications of the elected were "fundamental articles in a Republican Government
and ought to beftxed by the Constitution. '53 As M. Farrand notes in his Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, Madison argued:
[i]f the Legislature [of the United States] could regulate those [qualifications]
"See C. Warren, supra note 47. Warren also notes that by 1937 at least four amendments to the Constitution
had been proposed to add qualifications for Members of Congress to those specifically prescribed by the
Constitution. This reinforces his conclusion that the amendment process is the sole method to add
qualifications to those found in the Constitution. These proposals included "to make officers and
stockholders of the Bank of the United States ineligible, 2d Cong., 2d Sess., March 2, 1793; to make
Government contractors ineligible, 9th Cong., 1st Sess., March 29, 1806; l0th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1,
1808; 24th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 13, 1836...; [t]he New York ratifying Convention in 1788, and the
Massachusetts and Connecticut Legislatures in 1798, recommended an amendment [notably did not try to
pass amendments to their state Constitutions] making naturalized foreigners ineligible, as did the Legisla-
tures of Massachusetts and Connecticut, in 1815, following the recommendation of the Hartford
Convention." Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 1789-1889 (1897), by Herman v. Ames. Warren,
supra note 47, at 421 n.1.
o C. Warren, supra note 47, at 422.
s The proposal voted on read as follows. "The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to
establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said
Legislature shall seem expedient." Art. VI, Sec. 2 as reported by the Committee of Detail. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. at 533. See FARRtm, THE RcoRs oF im FEDRAL CoNvEmnotN op 1787 (1966), Vol
2, p.2 4 8 .
I2 The Powell Court focused extensively on this debate. It noted "[tihe debate on this proposal discloses
much about the views of the Framers on the issue of qualifications." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 533.
This expansive language implies broad precedential value. This may apply to more than exclusion cases.
n Id., (emphasis added). By arguing that qualifications "ought to be fixed by the Constitution", Madison,
by implication, opposes giving the power to alter qualifications to the state's legislatures. It is true,
however, that this debate centered on whether or not to give this power to the "Legislature of the United
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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of either [the electors or the elected], it can by degrees subvert the Constitution.
A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by
limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorized to
elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal
interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same reason for
being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with full confidence,
when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was
as improper as to all them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It
was a power also, which might be made subservient to the views of one faction
[against] another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be
devised... by the the stronger to keep out partizans of [a weaker]... fac-
tion.54
Madison also stated that "the British Parliament possessed the power of regulating
the qualifications both of the electors and the elected; and the abuse they had made
of it was a lesson worthy of our attention." 55 Madison continues "[t]hey [Members
of Parliament] had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views,
or to the views of political or [R]eligious parties."S6 The Powell Court notes that
"Madison's argument here was not aimed at the imposition of a property qualifica-
tion as such, but rather at the delegation to the Congress of the discretionary power
to establish any qualifications. The parallel between Madison's arguments and those
made in Wilkes behalf is striking."' This is further proof that the framers intended
the qualifications enumerated in the Constitution to be fixed and unalterable by
Congress.
The Convention agreed with Madison at the close of this debate, for "it
defeated the proposal to give to Congress power to establish qualifications in
general, by a vote of seven States to four, and it also defeated the proposal for a
property qualification, by a vote of seven States to three."5 Warren concludes:
[c]ertainly it [the Convention] did not intend that a single branch of Congress
should possess a power which the Convention had expressly refused to vest
in the whole Congress. As the Constitution, as then drafted, expressly set forth
the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence, and as the Convention
refused to grant to Congress power to establish qualifications in general, the
maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius would seem to apply.5
States." The PoweU Court quoted Madison for the proposition that qualifications ought to be fixed.
5' M. RAiN, 2 TmE RcoaRs oF Tim FEERAL CoNvENToN oF 1787, 250 (1966) (emphasis added). The
Powell Court quoted substantial parts of Farrand's report on Madison. See Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S.
at 533-34.
-- Madison here seems to refer to the Wilkes case. See infra at 16-17. See also C.WARRm, supra note 47,
at 420 n.I.
m M. FARRAN, supra note 4704, at 250.
7 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 534.
8 C. WARuwsN, supra note 47, at 421.
s
9 1d.
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Warren determined that the Convention felt neither Congress nor the states
should have the power to establish qualifications in general for membership in
Congress. He felt that additional qualifications may only be added or changed by
amending the Constitution. Warren also stated that Congress, in judging the
qualifications for membership, may not judge individuals on any basis other than
those enumerated in the qualifications clauses (age, citizenship, residency). These
two issues need to be distinguished. Term limit proponents focus exclusively on
Warren's conclusion interpreting the judging clause. Opponents, on the other hand,
highlight Warren's focus on the qualifications clauses.
The Powell Court explicitly accepted Warren's first conclusion pertaining to
congressional power.60 The Court further supported this conclusion by emphasizing
that the convention separately passed expulsion rules. For Congress to expel a
member, they needed to obtain a two-thirds vote to expel, not the bare majority
needed to exclude a member based on qualifications. As the Court stated:
the Convention's decision to increase the vote required to expel, because that
power 'was too importantto be exercised by a bare majority', while atthe same
time not similarly restricting the power to judge qualifications, is compelling
evidence that they considered the latter already limited by the standing
qualifications previously adopted.6'
The Court also examined post-convention state ratification debates in sup-
porting Warren's conclusion. These debates "also demonstrate the framers' under-
standing that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the
Constitution. '62 The Court here extensively quoted Madison and Hamilton from
The Federalist. Madison wrote in The Federalist #52 "[tlhe qualifications of the
elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and
being at the time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered
and regulated by the convention." 63 Alexander Hamilton agreed, stating that the
power of the national government is "expressly restricted to the regulation of the
' While the Powell Court does not explicitly hold that states may not add to the qualifications enumerated
in the Constitution, the Court's analysis applies equally to this proposition. See infra text at 19.
"' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 536.
6 Ild. at 540.
6 Madison's statement here that the qualifications of the elected are "more susceptible to uniformity" may
be interpreted as an argument against state-passed congressional term limits (assuming term limits are
qualifications). This statement reinforces the argument that there is great danger should separate states pass
different length term limits. See infra text at 53 for an explanation of this argument. The representative
power of the various states' congressional delegations would be either diluted or strengthened, contrary to
the framers' intentions. The Committee of Detail also reported out ART. VI, SFc. 2 (Property requirements)
without a specified amount of property because they could not agree on the amount of property to require.
Committee member Mr. Rutlidge noted in the debate on August 10,1787 that "the Committee had reported
no qualifications because they could not agree on any among themselves." FARRAwD, supra note 54, at 249.
The attempt to report a single property amount requirement implies that the committee felt qualifications
for members of Congress should be uniform across the country. Oliver Ellsworth (another Convention
delegate), however, disagreed with the effort to only report a single property requirement conclusion.
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW R~vimw
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/4
times, the places, and the manner of elections [Italics in original]. The qualifications
of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other
occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the
legislature. ."" The Powell Court also noted that Hamilton, prior to the New York
convention, stressed that" [The true principle of a republic is, that the people should
choose whom they please to govem them. Representation is imperfect in proportion
as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government,
popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty al-
lowed."65
The Powell Court went on to state:
[i]n Virginia, where the Federalists faced powerful opposition by advocates
of popular democracy, Wilson Carey Nicholas, a future member of both the
House and Senate and later Governor of the State, met the arguments that the
new Constitution violated democratic principles with the following interpre-
tation Of Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 [qualification clause] as it respects the qualifications
of the elected: 'It has ever been considered a great security to liberty, that very
few should be excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This
Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifications
required except those of age and residence, which create a certainty of their
judgment being matured, and of being attached to their state'.'
The fundamental right of the electorate to choose whom they wish to represent
them underlies the argument against term limits. Term limits not only deny the
opportunity for reelection to certain Members of Congress, but the excluded
incumbents have by definition served for extended periods of time. They were
selected time and again by their constituents to represent their district in Washing-
ton, D.C. Madison and Hamilton recognized this as a fundamental tenet of our
democracy. Madison alluded to the danger of restricting it in the Wilkes case, for
the Parliament previously had been able to exclude members arbitrarily by majority
vote. Madison pointed out at the Constitutional Convention that "this principle is
undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the
franchise itself."67 The Powell Court quoted Madison for this proposition in
affirming their agreement with him.6 Congressional acts excluding members are
equivalent to terms limits denying long-serving incumbents the right to run.
Hamilton stressed that each measure limited the right of people to "choose whom
they please to govern them."69
6The Federalist No. 60, at 402 (A. Hamilton) (H. Jones ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 540-541; 2 DEBATs ON Thm FEDERAL CoNs=snrFoN 257 (J. Elliot ed.
1876).
6Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 541; 2 DEBATES ON m FEDERAL CONSfmN 257, 2 9 2 -9 3 (J. Elliot ed.
1876) (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 547.
68d.
6The Federalist No. 60, (A. Hamilton). See also, 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoNsTIunToN 257 (J. Elliot ed.
1876); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 547.
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The Powell Court finally reinforces its view that Congress may not constitu-
tionally add qualifications by examining post-ratification cases and commentary by
Congress in exercising their judging power in particular exclusion cases.7" House
Speaker McCormack argues that Congress' own understanding of its power to judge
qualifications is crucial to its constitutionality.7 Congress, he argued, has excluded
members in the recent past on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Constitution.72 The Powell Court disagreed with McCormack's conclusion. They
first noted that "[flor almost the first 100 years of its existence.. .Congress strictly
limited its power to judge the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in
the Constitution."73 Regarding the exclusion cases cited by respondents, the Court
further recognized that "[because] an unconstitutional action has been taken before
surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.
Particularly in view of Congress' own doubts in those few cases where it did exclude
members-elect, we are not included to give its precedents controlling weight." 4
Congress' first confrontation with the judging clause occurred in 1807, when
"the eligibility of William McCreery was challenged because he did not meet
additional residency requirements imposed by the State of Maryland." '75 This
confrontation was also analyzed by the Powell Court. They examined the House
Committee on Elections' reasoning in that case, and recognized the Committee
Chairman's conclusion:
[t]he Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of members have
been unalterably determinedby the Federal Convention, unless changed by an
authority equal to that which framed the Constitution at first; that neither the
State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those
qualifications, so as to change them .... 76
The Chairman emphasized that the committee's narrow construction of this clause
"was compelled by the 'fundamental principle in a free govemment,'" that restric-
tions upon the people to choose their own representatives must be limited to those
'absolutely necessary for the safety of the society'.'78 The Chairman of the House
Committee shared Madison's and Hamilton's view that voters should freely choose
their elected representatives without significant restrictions.
70 395 U.S. at 541, 542.
71 Id.
72Id.
" Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 542.
74 Id. at 546-47.
7s Id. at 542.
76 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 872 (1807).)
7Id.
7 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
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The Powell Court finally found:
[i]n short, both the intention of the Framers, to the extent it can be determined,
and an examination of the basic principles of our democratic system persuade
us that the Constitution does not vest in the Congress a discretionary power
to deny membership by a majority vote.... [T]herefore, we hold that, since
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters of the 18th
Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to serve under any
provision of the Constitution, the House was without power to exclude him
from its membership. 79
2. Powell v. McCormack applied to State Action
Powell does not explicitly conclude that states may not constitutionally add
qualifications to the qualifications clause. However, its analysis and rationale for
holding that Congress may not add "qualifications" applies equally to states. Powell
implicitly denies the power to add qualifications to the states. The Powell Court's
analysis leads to the conclusion that "qualifications" may only be added by
amending the Constitution.80 The Powell Court based much of their holding on
Charles Warren's analysis of the Constitutional Convention. Warren explicitly
concluded that neither Congress nor that states may constitutionally add
"qualifications".81 Powell also quotes the chairman of the House Committee of
Elections in the McCreery exclusion case for the proposition that "neither the State
nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifications,
so as to change them... ",.82 James Madison and Alexander Hamilton's arguments
also apply equally to a state's ability to change "qualifications" set in the
Constitution. If the qualifications are "fixed in the Constitution," as Madison states,
and as quoted in Powell, this prohibits a single state alone from changing it."3
Many eminent jurists and authorities on constitutional law have also uni-
formly held that states may not add such qualifications. Jts gI ioseph Story
concluded that states "have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new
qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president. Each is an officer
of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the Constitution, and
neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states."" Chancellor
Kent, a learned judge and well-known legal author, concluded that "[t]he question
whether the individual states can superadd to, or vary the qualifications prescribed
to the representative by the Constitution of the United States, is examined in Mr.
Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, ii. 99-103. But the objections to
79 Id. at 548-49.
$Old. at 542.
31 Id. at 548.
82 395 U.S. at 542-43.
83 1d. at 540.
" J. STORY, STORY ON m CoNsTTUnION 626-27 (3d ed. 1925).
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the existence of any such power appear to me to be too palpable and weighty to admit
of any discussion. [Citation Omitted]"" Judge Cooley, in his General Principles of
Constitutional Law, 6 agrees. "The Constitution and laws of the United States
determine what shall be the qualifications for federal offices, and state constitutions
and laws can neither add to nor take away from them. This has been repeatedly
decided in Congress in the case of persons elected to seats therein, when provisions
in the state constitution, if valid, would render them ineligible."87 Finally, Mr.
Burdick in his treatise The Law of the American Constitution,"8 stated that "[i]t is
clearly the intention of the Constitution that all persons not disqualified by the terms
of that instrument should be eligible to the federal office of Representative. ' 9 State
courts have uniformly held that states may not add to the qualifications for federal
office enumerated in the U.S. Constitution. 90
3. Alternative Interpretation of Powell v. McCormack
Despite the Powell Court's conclusions, it is important to explore alternative
interpretations of the origin of these clauses.91 P. Allan Dionisopoulos offers such
an interpretation.92 Dionisopoulos concludes that the Framers intended Congress to
be able to add qualifications to those enumerated in the qualifications clauses.9 He
underscores the fact that the First Congress in 1790 enacted a statute imposing a
permanent disqualification from Congress on those individuals convicted of offer-
ing bribes to federal judges and on those federal judges convicted of accepting
bribes. 94 Congress imposed a disqualification by statute, not by constitutional
amendment. Dionisopoulos contends that "[s]ince that First Congress was com-
prised of James Madison and many others who served at the Constitutional
Convention, this enactment of 1790 raises a doubt with respect to Warren's assertion
that qualifications may not be prescribed by statute." 9
Dionisopoulos also examines Article VI, Clause 3, of the Constitution, which
states "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
J. KENT, ComTAR.o AJES ON Amiac4N LAw 229 n. (f) (12th ed. 1873).
T. CooLEY, TmE GEmEAL PuNapLEs oF CONSrnmONAL LAW 285,290 (3d ed. 1925).
'7 Id (emphasis added).
" C. ButRwcK, THE LAw OF Tm AMEiuCAN CosNrrtoN 160, 165 (1922).
89 Id.
'oFor further discussion, see State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane,65 Wyo. 189; 197 P.2d. 864 (1948).
91 The Powell Court earlier noted that, while "petitioners' [Powell ...] ultimate conclusion is correct", the
[Constitutional] debates are subject to other interpretations." Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. at 532.
' Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the Constitutional Issues in the Powell and Related Cases, 17 J.Put.L.
103 (1968).
9Id at 15..
" Id. at 108. The statute was An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, Ch.
9, Stat. 112 (1790). It read that any person offering a bribe "to obtain or procure the opinion, judgment, or
decree of any judge of the United States, in any suit, controversy, matter, or cause...and shall be thereof
convicted...[and the judge accepting such bribe] shall forever be disqualified to hold any office of honor,
trust, or profit, under the United States." Id.
" Dionisopolous, supra note 92, at 109.
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public Trust under the United States."9 He argues that the clause's simple existence
in the Constitution raises doubts concerning whether the framers felt Congress could
alter qualifications for congressional office. 97 If the Framers felt additional quali-
fications could only be added by amending the Constitution, the Convention had no
need to enact this clause.98
I believe the only method by which additional qualifications may be added is
by amending the Constitution. Both Charles Warren and the Powell Court
thoroughly analyze the origins of the relevant constitutional provisions and conclu-
sively justify their determination that Congress may not add qualifications to those
enumerated in the Constitution. Dionisopoulos' first point regarding the action of
the first Congress, however, is troublesome. It is not, however, a constitutional
provision. His contention that James Madison and others were in the first Congress
seems contradictory. Madison and Hamilton's language from the Federalist and
during the Constitutional Convention seem so clear as to minimize the relevance of
their simple presence in the first Congress. Dionisopoulos' second point is also
unpersuasive. The "religious test" provision was probably enacted to serve as
insurance against the possibility that Congress might attempt to exclude a member
due to his/her religious affiliation. Many states had religious tests in their state
constitutions at this time. The Convention may have wanted to explicitly go on
record as opposing religious tests for office. Also, Britain's history of religious
controversy and political strife based on separate religious groups vying for power
made a deep impression on American colonists' minds. Religious freedom was a
basis for this country's existence. Our Founding Fathers probably wanted to go on
record and explicitly state their views on religious freedom in the Constitution
through the "religious test" provision.
Despite this thorough analysis of the historical background underlying the
judging clause and the qualifications issue, the Powell Court explicitly refused to
address one issue potentially relevant to term limits. The Court stated that it was not
deciding whether Congress may judge members-elect on the basis of qualifications
found in the Constitution yet not enumerated in the qualifications clauses. 99 These
included,
[i]n addition to the three qualifications set forth in Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, [which]
authorizes the disqualification of any person convicted in an impeachment
proceeding from.'any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States';
Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, provides that 'no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office';
and § 3 of the 14th Amendment disqualifies any person 'who, having
9 U.S. CoNsT. art. VT, cl. 3.
9ldat 109.
98Id.
"Powell v. McCormack, 595 U.S. at 520 n.41.
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previously taken an oath*** to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof.' [Others also argue that] .. .the [g]uarantee
[c]lause of Article VI and the oath requirement of Art VI, cl. 3, is no less a
"qualification" within the meaning of Art. I § 5 [judging clause] than those set
forth in Art. I § 2 [qualification clause]. 100
The Powell Court concluded that, "[w]e need not reach this question, however, since
both sides agree that Powell was not ineligible under any of these provisions." ''
Term limit supporters believe this omission indicates that the Powell Court's
holding that Congress may not add qualifications to those enumerated in the entire
Constitution is not absolute. I believe this depends upon the context in which Powell
is analyzed. Term limits are the context to which we now turn in examining the
effects of Powell v. McCormack.
4. Powell v. McCormack's Relevance to Term Limits
Powell lends a great deal of force to term limit opponents' initial contention
that neither Congress nor the states may add to or change qualifications found in the
Constitution. The sole method to limit congressional terms is to amend the
Constitution. The sweeping language in Powell regarding the right of voters to
choose their elected representatives, and the Framers' clear intention as interpreted
by Powell to only minimally limit the pool of candidates, reflects a distinctly hostile
attitude to actions which limit voters' franchise and choice. Term limits by
definition restrict the eligible pool of candidates for election and significantly limit
the right of voters to choose their own representatives. They might consequently be
labeled an additional "qualification," and, as such, unconstitutional as attempts to
add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution. However, courts in other
contexts have held that measures limiting voters' choices are constitutional. These
decisions need to be examined to explore how Powell's conclusions have withstood
more recent Supreme Court analysis.
Term limit supporters also note that Powell was an exclusion case. Even if
term limits are additional "qualifications", which is not conceded, such a conclusion
should only be reached after the Supreme Court examines the qualifications clauses
in the context of either Congress' or a state's attempts to add qualifications, not in
addressing the judging clause. As a result, the question of whether term limits are
an unconstitutional addition to the qualifications clauses, or are simply further
attempts by states to regulate congressional elections, remains unanswered. While
the Supreme Court has not extensively addressed the qualifications issues since
Powell, lower courts have applied Powell's holdings to various contexts. Many
courts found particular state statutes unconstitutional as impermissibly adding
100 Id.
101 Id-
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"qualifications" to the Constitution. These decisions provide the context for
examining what constitutes additional "qualifications."
What constitutes an additional "qualification?"
The United States Supreme Court has never questioned whether term limits
constitute a "qualification" for office. No court has explicitly defined the term
"qualification" in an election context. Webster's defines a qualification as "a
condition that must be compiled with (as for the attainment of a privilege) [a.. .for
membership]". 1 2 By this definition, term limits might impose a "qualification" for
office. They eliminate from consideration for office incumbents who do not satisfy
the "condition." If an incumbenthas served a specified number of terms in Congress,
he/she does not "qualify" to run for office. Courts, however, have developed a more
sophisticated analysis in addressing this issue.
Courts have approached the question of what constitutes "qualifications" for
office in two different ways. First, some courts take what may be called the "direct
qualifications approach". These courts directly confront the action (usually a state
statute) limiting candidates' and voters' rights. They determine if the action rises
to such a level as to constitute a qualification for office. If it does, they strike it down
as unconstitutionally adding a "qualification" for office per Powell. If the statute's
provisions do not rise to the requisite level, it is deemed constitutional under the state
regulation clause. Four federal district court decisions utilized this direct qualifica-
tions approach.°3 Each held the state statutes unconstitutional as adding "qualifi-
cations."1" State courts addressing state election statutes have also uniformly
addressed the issue of qualifications directly.105 Although many of the state election
statutes decisions were rendered prior to Powell, each held that states could not add
to, nor take away from, qualifications enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.'I
Courts have also examined the issue of qualifications by analyzing whether
particular state election statutes violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment or the first amendment free speech clause. Term limit opponents
contend term limits unconstitutionally impinge on the fundamental right of voters
to elect a candidate of their choice. Term limit supporters respond that states were
constitutionally granted the power to regulate congressional elections through the
1, WBSm's NEw CouL cu.m DicNARY, (1979).
"' UnitedStates v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. N.Y. 1982); Dillonv. Fiorina, 340F. Supp. 729 (Con.
M. 1972), Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Exon v. Tieman, 279 f. Supp. 609 (D. Neb.
1968).
' Exon v. Tieman, 279 F. Supp. at 612-14; Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. at 1298. Dillon v. Fiorina, 340
F. Supp. at 731; U.S. v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. at 608.
"S State courts may provide a better opportunity for favorable decisions for term limit opponents as a result.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court exercises ultimate authority in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, and
may overturn state supreme courts on this issue.
106 Exon v. Tieman, 279 F. Supp. at 613; Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. at 1297-98; Dillon v. Fiorina, 340
F. Supp. at 731; U.S. v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. at 607.
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state regulation clause.10° U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stevens recognizes, however,
that this debate is complicated because any regulation of elections "inevitably
effects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to
associate with others for political ends."" Court decisions explicitly rely on Powell
for this proposition in holding particular state statutes unconstitutional. Courts
addressing these challenges must "inevitably" balance states' interests in regulating
Congressional elections against voters' interests in having the broadest opportunity
to choose their representatives and associate for political reasons. If state statutes
impact too severely on voters' interests, courts hold the statutes unconstitutional as
violating either the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Speech Clause, or both. If
states' interests trump voters' interests, courts uphold the statute, citing the state
regulation clause. The Supreme Court utilizes this basic approach in ballot access
restriction cases ("Balancing Approach"). Unfortunately, each subsequent Supreme
Court ballot access case seems to redefine the standard and type of review required
when such statutes are analyzed.
One Supreme Court decision and two circuit court decisions have also
analyzed ballot access statutes by separately addressing the "direct qualifications"
challenge and the "balancing" Equal Protection and Free Speech challenge. 109 These
decisions will be examined as fitting within the Supreme Court's overall balancing
approach for ballot access decisions.
The ballot access decisions will be closely scrutinized to ascertain possible
considerations that would tilt the balance for or against term limits.
1. Direct Qualifications Approach
a. Federal Court Decisions
Four Federal District Court decisions directly applied Powell's holding
regarding the addition of qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution.
Each used the direct qualifications approach. It should be noted that no decision has
impugned Powell's conclusion that Congress may not constitutionally add qualifi-
cations to those enumerated in the Constitution.110 These District Court decisions
explicitly rely on Powell for this proposition in holding particular state statutes un-
constitutional.
07 See supra text at 11. This provision states "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic) Senators."
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4.
"I Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
'09 See infra text at 35, Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). See also infra text at 37-38, Signorelli v.
Evans, 637 F. 2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980). See also infra text at 38, Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.
1983).
"'Term limit supporters contend Storerv. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974), however,
explicitly limits Powell. See infra text at 35 for a full discussion of this contention.
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In United States v. Richmond,"' a Member of Congress agreed to plead guilty
to income tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201), supplementing the salary of a
federal employee (18 U.S.C. § 209) and possession of marijuana (21 U.S.C.
§ 844) [as part of a plea bargain agreement.] He also undertook to immedi-
ately resign from Congress and withdraw as a candidate for re-election. The
government, in return, consented not to prosecute him for a variety of other
crimes. 112
The Richmond Court invalidated the portions of the plea agreement pertaining to his
resignation from Congress and his withdrawal as a candidate for reelection. Portions
of the plea agreement were held impermissible as an "unconstitutional interference
by the executive with the legislative branch of government and with the rights of the
defendant's constituents.""'
The Richmond Court recognized that a fundamental tenet of our democratic
system is that voters should "retain the broadest freedom to select legislative
representatives.""14 The Richmond Court also noted that adding or detracting from
the enumerated qualifications found in the Constitution limited this choice. "Our
government's founders deliberately withheld from Congress the authority to add or
detract from the enumerated qualifications" for this reason."' The Court further
emphasized that "[t]he courts have not permitted attenuation of this fundamental
principle.... [in fact,] [i]t is significant that even the states are barred from imposing
additional qualifications on congressional candidates." ' 6 The Court concluded that
"U]ust as Congress and the states are prohibited from interfering with the choice of
the people for congressional office, federal prosecutors may not, directly or
indirectly, subvert the people's choice or deny them the opportunity to vote for any
candidate."'" 7 Federal prosecutors attempted to restrict the rights of both Congress-
man Richmond and his constituents. The agreement was held unconstitutional.
Dillon v. Fiorina,I" directly applied Powell in striking down a New Mexico
statute which required candidates in a congressional primary election to have resided
in that state for one year and to have been a party member for an additional year prior
to the election. 1 9 This statute was declared unconstitutional for it added "an
impermissible requirement of at least two years residency to the qualifications for
United States Senator.. . ."20 The court stated that the proposition "[t]hat a state
cannot add to or take away from these qualifications is well settled."' 2'
"u 550 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
112 ld.
"' Id (emphasis added).
114 d. at 607.
I131d.
"' ld (emphasis added).
117 Id.
"' Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972).
119 Id. at 730.
12' Dilon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. at 729, 731.
121 d.
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In Stack v. Adams,' 2 the court for the Northern District of Florida employed
a similar analysis in invalidating a Florida statute preventing state officials from
simultaneously running for federal office. 123 The statute required state officials to
resign their positions if they wished to run for Congress. The Stack court first noted
that "the qualifications prescribed in the United States Constitution are exclusive
and that state constitutions and laws can neither add to nor take away from them is
universally accepted and recognized."''1 The court also stressed that the "fundamen-
tal principle involved is the right of the people to elect whom they choose to elect
for office."'2 The court concluded that the "Florida statute.. .does provide an
additional qualification not provided by the Constitution for election to Congress...
it is a flat disqualification."' 1 The court goes on to explain what it means by "flat
disqualification". One crucial element of the court's analysis rested on the fact that
a Florida state official may not even be elected by a write-in campaign unless he/she
resigned from his/her state office. This write-in possibility had been earlier
categorized in a separate case as being a part of a regulation, not a flat disqualifica-
tion. 127
Finally, in Exon v. Tiemann, the District Court for the District of Nebraska
held that because there was no requirement in the U.S. Constitution that a U.S.
representative must live in the district from which he/she was nominated, a state
cannot add such a requirement. 12 While this was a pre-Powell decision, its exami-
nations directly tracks the Powell line by analyzing the statute utilizing the direct
qualifications approach.
b. State Court Decisions
State court's approach this issue in a similarly direct fashion. They uniformly
hold that no state may add, subtract, or change qualifications for the office of federal
representatives. These decisions examine a variety of circumstances to ascertain if
the various statutes constitute additional "qualifications" to those enumerated in the
U.S. Constitution. The following is an overview of the circumstances where state
courts have addressed this issue. The approach in these cases is of paramount
concern. Some of the statutes found to constitute additional "qualifications" have
been questioned by subsequent federal decisions. Many of these cases are pre-
Powell.
, Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295, 1297 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
See generally id.
124 Id.
12Sd.
126 Id.
"7 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) may undermine the holdings in Dillon and Stack. See infra text
at 32-33. However, these district court decisions are important in laying out the approach and analysis used
by the courts, not the ultimate holdings. The challenged statutes do not generally bear much resemblance
to term limits. The only resemblance is all these statutes infringe the same voters rights - although to
differing degrees - and in one sense may be said to constitute "qualifications." This will also be explored
later in more depth as part of Supreme Court holdings utilizing the "balancing" approach.1 Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp at 614.
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State statutes held unconstitutional:12 9
Stae Citaon
1. Judges are ineligible to become candidates for any other office during judicial
terms.
Washington: State v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P.569 (1918).
Oregon: Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Ore. 439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934).
Arizona: Stockton v. McFarland, 56 Ariz. 138, 106 P.2d 328 (1940).
Delaware: Buckingham v. Killoran, 42 Del. 405, 35 A.2d907 (1944).
Wisconsin: State v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946).
Oklahoma: Riley v. Cordell, 200 Okl.390, 194 P.2d 857 (1948).
Indiana: State v. Sup.Ct-MarCy, 238 Ind.421,151 N.E.2d508(1958).
2. No elected state legislator may accept a civil appointment to any office -
including U.S. Senate - during term to which elected.
Michigan: Richardson v. Hare, 381 Mich. 304, 160N.W.2d 883 (1968).
3. No candidate for nomination at the primary election who was defeated may be
a candidate for the same office at the ensuing general election.
North Dakota: State v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89 (1942).
Alaska: Benesch v. Miller, 446 P.2d 400 (1968).
4. Person must be resident of congressional district where seeking election.
Maryland: Hellmann v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 141 A.2d 908 (1958).
New Mexico: State v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968).
5. Governor must resign office to run for Congress.
Wyoming: State v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d. 864 (1948).
South Dakota: In Opinion of the Judges, 79 S.D. 585, 116 N.W.2d 233
(1962).
' For extensive discussion of many of these cases and the underlying proposition that a state cannot add
to or change qualifications for federal office, see also State v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864 (1948);
Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Ore. 439,30 P.2d 1037 (1934); and Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177,76 A.2d 332,
appeal &smissed, 340 U.S. 881 (1950). 27
Latz: Congressional Term Limits
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
182 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1
6. No person convicted of a felony may run for Congress.
Minnesota: Eaton v. Schmahl, 140 Minn. 219, 167 N.W.481 (1918).
7. Convicted felons are ineligible to run for office.
Minnesota: Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d 484
(1950).
8. Person who advocates international communism and avowed leader of Com-
munist Party in America is ineligible to run.
New York: In re. O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1940).
9. Person must swear oath he/she is not subversive, defined as those advocating
or teaching overthrow of constitutional form of U.S. or state government by
revolution, force or violence.
Maryland: Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332, appeal
dismissed 340 U.S. 881 (1950).
10. City Charter provided that President of City Council must not hold or qualify
for any other elective office.
Georgia: Lowe v. Fowler, 240 Ga. 213, 240 S.E.2d 70 (1977).
State statutes held constitutional:
These statutes were not deemed additional "qualifications". They were constitu-
tional per the State Regulation Clause.
5t Citatio
1. No person who was a candidate for an office in the primary election, and who
was defeated, may by petition be placed on the general election ballot for any
other office.
Held: no additional qualificlation because person could be elected by write-
in votes. No absolute disqualification.
Nebraska: State v. Swanson, 127 Neb. 806, 257 N.W. 255 (1934).
2. Sheriff must resign from office to become a candidate for Congress.
Florida: Davis v. Adams, 238 So.2d 415, (Fla. 1970).
28
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3. District attorneys may not run for any office which has a term concurrent at any
time to the district attorney's elected term.
Held: constitutional because district attorney may resign district attorney
position to run for Congress.
Oklahoma: Okla. State Election Board v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776, (Okla.
1980).
4. Candidates for office required to appoint campaign treasurer.
Maryland: Sec of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70,222 A.29 693 (1966).
2. Balancing Approach
a. Constitutional Rights Affected by Term Limits
Term limits affect five constitutional rights or interests."' These
include the right to candidacy, the right to vote for the candidate of your
choice, the right to vote effectively, the right to associate, and the state
right to regulate. Each rests on different constitutional bases, and will be
separately examined.
1. Right to Candidacy
Term limits completely deny the U.S. Senator or Representative who has
served the requisite number of consecutive terms the right to be a candidate for that
office in that election ("right to candidacy"). The Supreme Court does not recognize
afundamental right to candidacy. As Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice) wrote
for a plurality of the Court in Clements v. Fashing,31 "[f]ar from recognizing
candidacy as a 'fundamental right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a
1
3 0 Courts note that ballot access restrictions infringe on these rights. Term limits are a form of ballot access
restriction. Term limits differ, however, for they restrict particular incumbents from office, not just from
the ballot.
M Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133(1982), ... Justice Rehnquist (now
Chief Justice) wrote for himself, Justices O'Connor, Powell and Chief Justice Burger. Justice Stevens filed
an opinion in which he joins in Parts I, 1H and V of Rehnquists plurality opinion and in the judgment. Justice
Brennan filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and which was
joined by Justice White in Part I. The above quoted section is from Part III of the Rehnquist opinion. This
part was supported by the plurality.
In Clements plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two state statutes restricting their ability to get
on the ballot. The first statute rendered an officeholder (such as ajudge) ineligible for the state legislature
if his current term of office did not expire until after the legislative term to which he aspires begins. Second,
plaintiffs challenged a "resign to run" statute. It required that a wide range of state of county officeholders
resign if they became candidates for other offices at a time when their unexpired term of office exceeded
one year. The Supreme Court held that these provisions did not violate the first amendment. Four members
of the Court found that the resign to run statute did not violate the equal protection clause.
This decision implicates many state cases earlier cited which took the "direct qualifications approach".
However, the critical factor noted above was not the ultimate holding of the various state statutes, but the
approach followed by the courts.
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candidate's access to the ballot 'does not of itself compel close scrutiny'."" Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall and White in their dissent agree with the plurality
here, yet note that "[a]lthough we have never defined candidacy as a fundamental
right, we have clearly recognized that restrictions on candidacy impinge on first
amendment rights of candidates and voters."133 These additional first amendment
rights include voters right to vote for the candidate of their choice and their right to
associate.
2. Right to Vote for the Candidate of Your Choice
These dissenting justices would recognize that term limits, which restrict the
candidacy of long-serving incumbents, deny voters of that state or congressional
district the right to vote for that senator or representative in that election ("right to
vote for the candidate of your choice"). The right to candidacy and the right to vote
for the candidate of your choice interrelate. The U.S. Supreme Court noted in
Bullock v. Carter, 13 that "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters." '135 Justice Stevens also stressed this point
in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 13 noting that any election regulation "inevitably effects
- at least to some degree - the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with
others for political ends." 137
The right to vote for the candidate of your choice is almost universally granted
fundamental status. This right is clearly infringed by term limits, which restrict a
voter's right to vote for particular incumbents. James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton in the constitutional debates underscored the fundamental nature of this
right, seeing it as a crucial tenet of our system of representative democracy. Term
limit opponents base their rejection of term limits on the infringement of this right.
It also composed a critical element in Powell v. McCormack."
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims,139 stated that
"[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of represen-
tative government. "40 This right is recognized as fundamental in most ballot access
cases. In Williams v. Rhodes,1 41 the Court faced an Ohio statute which "made it
virtually impossible for a new political party, even though it has hundreds of
132 Id. at 963. See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
33Id. at 978 n.2.
'3 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
135 Id. at 143.
t Anderson v. CeleBrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
37 Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
3 395 U.S. at 519.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
I40 d. at 555 (emphasis added). This was a reapportionment case, not a ballot access case. That this
particular right to vote was also implicated here is further proof of its fundamental nature.
141 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/4
CONGREssIONAL TERM LImrrs
thousands of members, or an old party, which has a very small number of members,
[third parties were implicated, not the two major parties] to be placed on the state
ballot to choose electors pledged to particular candidates for the Presidency and Vice
Presidency of the United States."142 The American Independent Party challenged the
Ohio statutes that would have denied its candidate, George Wallace, access to the
1968 presidential ballot. The Williams Court stated that ballot access restrictions
impinge on "the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to
cast their votes effectively. [This right].. ."of course, rank[s] among our most
precious freedoms."' 4 3 The Court also quoted Wesberry v. Sanders,'" a reappoint-
ment case, for noting that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined."'145 The Williams Court emphasized that "the right to vote is
heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two parties at a time when
other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot."'"
3. Right to Vote Effectively
Term limits also affect the right of every citizen to cast a vote as weighty as
every other ("right to vote effectively"). This right to vote was undermined in many
reapportionment and franchise cases. Term limits of different lengths placed on
congressional terms in separate states give significantly different power to particu-
lar members of Congress. 47 Seniority in the U.S. House and Senate affects the
power of its representatives. Members with less seniority tend to exercise less
power. While I believe term limits impinge the "right to vote effectively", this
proposition may not be constitutionally supportable because the seniority structure
of the House and Senate is not required.148 Not only is it constantly subject to
challenge within Congress by amending the House and Senate Rules or voting senior
members from committee chairs, it also has been substantially limited in the past.149
As a result, the infringement of this right in the constitutional context will not be
examined.
The Supreme Court does not, unfortunately, often explicitly distinguish
between the right to vote for the candidate of your choice and the right to vote
effectively. Noted constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe, however, recognizes the
distinction between the two different types of the right to vote as well as the Supreme
'421d. at 30.
143 Id. While this may sound as if the Court here implicates the "right to vote effectively", Tribe, infra note
148, disagrees.
'" Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964),
14S Id. at 17.
'"Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31.
'
47 See infra text Section mL
14 This may prove to be a further subject for research.
14 9 See supra note 30.
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Court's continuing ambiguity on this matter.15° Tribe notes "[t]he right to vote
invoked here [in Williams, the Supreme Court's first modem ballot access restriction
decision] differs radically from the right to vote that underlay the reapportionment
and franchise cases (footnote 11), which involved the right of every citizen to cast
a vote as weighty as that of every other." '' The Supreme Court recognizes the right
to vote effectively most often in reapportionment and franchise decisions, and has
not addressed it in the context on ballot access restriction decisions.
4. Right to Associate
The right of individuals to associate for the advancement of their political
beliefs is also burdened by term limits ("right to associate"). Term limits deny
political parties the right to choose whom they wish to choose as a representative in
Congress by restricting their choice of potential candidates. If a political parties'
chosen representative is the incumbent who has previously served the specified
number of terms, term limits deny him/her a place on the ballot or the possibility of
being elected to Congress. 152
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Rhodes and subsequent ballot access cases
recognizes the fundamental nature of this right. The Williams Court stated that:
the state laws place burdens on.. .the right of individuals to associate
for the advancement of political beliefs.... [This right is also] among
our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that freedom of
association is protected by the first amendment. And of course this
freedom, which is protected from federal encroachment by the first
amendment is entitled under the fourteenth amendment to the same pro-
tection from infringement by the States.15 3
The Williams Court also explains that "[t]he right to form a party for the
advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election
ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes."' Term limits may
operate to keep the party's chosen candidates off the election ballot. This is
especially egregious as term limits will most likely infringe the majority party's right
to associate in that congressional district. One of the two major parties' candidates
ISOL. TRIBE, AmimCAc CONSTmIONAL LAW, § 1320 (2d Ed. 1988).
15 Id. at 1103.
1
52 This assumes that the legislator's political party selects its incumbent to represent them in the general
election. The vast majority of incumbents wishing to run again are selected as their party's nominee.
This also depends on how the term limit statute reads. For instance, a partial term limit statute might deny
a certain incumbent a place on the printed ballot, allowing the incumbent to be elected if enough write-in
votes are cast.
' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30,31. The rubric for challenging states' infringement of this right is
by violation of the first amendment as applied to the States by the fourteenth amendment.
154d. at31.
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will be denied access to the ballot and to election. 55
5. State Right to Regulate
Each of the first four rights, examined to differing degrees, command the
protection of the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Term limits, however, also affect the right of states to regulate federal
elections as provided in the state regulation clause of the U.S. Constitution ("state
right to regulate"). Term limits affect the constitutional right of a state to regulate
federal elections. The state interests to which this right serves as an umbrella are
varied and depend a great deal on the particular circumstances and context of the state
statutes. Courts recognize that some regulation of access to the ballot is necessary
in order to conduct orderly and effective elections and to maintain comprehensible
ballots. These state interests must be weighed against the right to vote for the
candidate of your choice and voters' right to associate. (The right to candidacy and
the right to vote effectively are not relevant in this context.)
The parameters of the state's rights under this clause are set out by the Supreme
Court in Oregon v. Mitchell,5' quoting from Smiley v. Holm. In Smiley, Chief
Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous court stated:
The subject matter is the 'times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives.' It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive
words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registra-
tion, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and
corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and
making and publication of inspection returns; in short, to enact the numerous
requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are
necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved....
This view is confirmed by the second clause of Article, I, § 4, [state regulation
clause] which provides that'the Congress may at any time by law make or alter
such regulations,' with the single exception stated. The phrase 'such regula-
tions' plainly refers to regulations of the same general character that the
legislature of the State is authorized to prescribe with respect to congressional
elections. In exercising this power, the Congress may supplement these state
regulations or may substitute its own .... It 'has a general supervisory power
over the whole subject.'"5
At this time, Congressman Bernard Sander from Connecticut is the only Member of Congress not a
member of either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. He belongs to the Socialist Party. The
likelihood that term limits will restrict third parties' candidates from election is highly speculative.
' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (emphasis added).
'Id. at 123, (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,366-67 (1932)).
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The "congressional override" provision is critical. If courts hold term
limits constitutional, Congress may pass laws superseding state-passed term limits
by exercising its "general supervisory power". It might, however, prove politically
dangerous, for term limits are extremely popular with the American electorate.'"
The Supreme Court has valued these five rights differently depending on the
circumstances of each case. The extent to which the particular rights are infringed
greatly affects the Court's analysis. It is critical to separate out the rights involved.
However, the Supreme Court notes, in many of these ballot access restriction
decisions, that two constitutional provisions are often affected. There is a first
amendment claim which has been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. There is also a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim. The
Supreme Court in the ballot access and election area has not, however, engaged in
traditional fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis. While distinguishing
rights which are "fundamental" remains critical, the distinction in ballot access
decisions has not dictated the level of scrutiny which the Court has applied. In
traditional equal protection analysis, the nature of the right dictates the level of
scrutiny applied by the courts.
Courts may never address the tension between state interests in regulating
federal elections and voters' fundamental rights to vote for the candidate of their
choice and their right to associate. If this is the case, no court needs to engage in first
amendment or equal protection analysis. Courts might simply conclude term limits
are an added "qualification" unconstitutionally imposed by the states. Term limits
here would not be analyzed as a form of ballot access restriction. Ballot access
restriction have never been addressed in the context of denying the candidate of a
major party a place on the ballot. Most ballot access decisions involve classifica-
tion schemes imposing burdens on new or small political parties or independent
candidates. These schemes effectively keep small parties off the ballot. Other ballot
access decisions use classifications based on wealth which have a disproportionately
harsh impact on less wealthy candidates. 159 A court may not use the balancing rubric
at all for term limits. It may approach term limits in the direct qualifications mariner.
Courts may otherwise view term limits as a more absolute form of ballot
access restriction. They would then utilize the ballot access "balancing" approach.
The Supreme Court has addressed the interests implicated in ballot access cases in
a sophisticated manner. We now turn to the Supreme Court's confusing and
somewhat contradictory decisions concerning the level of scrutiny to which ballot
access restrictions have been subjected.
1- See supra note 1.
15 See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 965. which categorizes the ballot access decisions.
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b. Level of Scrutiny for Ballot Access Restrictions
"The Supreme Court has never stated the level of scrutiny applicable to ballot
access restrictions with crystal clarity." 6° This understatement by Circuit Court
Judge Goldberg in Hatten v. Rains, illustrates the uncertainty of Supreme Court
rulings in this area. Goldberg states:
[t]he [ballot access] cases got off to a rocky start In Williams v. Rhodes .... [the
Supreme Court] applied strict scrutiny, holding that the election laws violated
both the fundamental right of association and the fundamental right to vote.
The Court, however, did little to explain the scope of the rights violated and
why some restrictions on ballot access might be subject to strict scrutiny while
others might not. The Supreme Court's next ballot access case did little to
clear up this confusion. InJenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, (1971), the Court
refused to apply strict scrutiny to Georgia's less restrictive petition require-
ments and filing fees, but failed to explain what distinguished the Georgia
restrictions from those invalidated in Williams.161
Unfortunately, subsequent Supreme Court ballot access cases did not clear up
the confusion. The Supreme Court seems to have used four separate levels of
scrutiny in addressing ballot access restriction cases. They began by applying
traditional strict scrutiny.
1. Traditional Strict Scrutiny
a. William v. Rhodes (1968).162
The Supreme Court in Williams, invalidated highly restrictive petition
requirements which disadvantaged small parties in Ohio. The Court followed a strict
scrutiny-like approach. 163 The Williams Court found two fundamental rights in-
fringed: the right to vote for the candidate of yourchoice, and the right to associate. 164
The Court then held that the "[s]tate has here failed to show any'compelling interest'
which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate."165
The Williams Court also found a less restrictive alternative available. 166 This inquiry
into whether a less restrictive alternative is available is a crucial component of
traditional strict scrutiny analysis. The Court finally stated that "the number of
voters in favor of a party, along with other circumstances, is relevant in considering
whether state laws violate the equal protection clause."' 67
16, Hatten v. Rains, 854, F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
161 Id. at 693-94n.9.
'
6a William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
16 M- at 34.
164 Id.
16s Id at 34.
166 393 U.S. at 35.
I Id. at 34.
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Term limits would be unconstitutional according to this criteria because they
infringe the right of all the voters in one of the two major parties to choose their
candidate. As a practical matter, the two major parties receive the vast majority of
votes cast in congressional elections.
b. Bullock v. Carter"es (1972).
The Bullock Court analyzed a Texas statute that required candidates to pay a
large filing fee to get their names placed on the ballot. 169 The Bullock Court held that,
because the statute "has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise
[the right to vote]",170 and because the impact"is related to the resources of the voters
supporting a particular candidate .... the laws must be 'closely scrutinized' and
found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in
order to pass constitutional muster."'1 71 The provision was found unconstitutional
because the state interests cited (an interest in regulating the ballot, thus preventing
overcrowding, and an interest in candidates helping pay the administrative costs of
the election), while legitimate, did not meet the standard imposed. The Court also
recognized that no less restrictive alternative existed. 72
c. Lubin v. Panish17 3 (1974).
The Lubin Court invalidated a California statute that required candidates for
county supervisor to pay a filing fee in order to secure a place on the primary ballot. '4
The case was distinguished from Bullock because the required filing fee was smaller
and the challenge in Lubin was brought by an indigent candidate' 7 The Lubin
Court, however, also acknowledged the burden imposed on the right to vote and to
associate. 76 It further recognized that the state's interest in maintaining a manage-
able ballot and barring frivolous candidacies were legitimate. 17 It refused to afford
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
6 Id. at 134. Some note that Bullock and Lubin are filing fee cases, and are treated differently from other
ballot access decisions The plurality in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 965 makes this argument, stating
that "[olne line of ballot access cases involves classifications based on wealth." It then cites Bullock and
Lubin as this line. However, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979), the Court cites Bullock and Lubin for precedential value in setting up its level of scrutiny for ballot
access restrictions. The distinction between the two lines of ballot access decisions may be relevant in some
contexts, however, their distinction here does not appear necessary.
170 1d. at 144. The standard is "[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic
light the extent and nature of their impact on voters." Id at 143.
171 Id.
" Id. at 144. While appellants in Bullock argued that a candidate may be placed on the general election
ballot absent payment of fees by satisfying the petition requirement, the Court found this alternative
unreasonable. The alternative required candidates and voters to abandon their party affiliation (in
bypassing the primary, candidates and voters may only get on the general election ballot as an independent)
to avoid paying filing fees.
" Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
174 Id.
17s Id. at 716.
1
76 Id.
77Jd. at 715.
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them compelling status, however, forto do so would have been to find the challenged
statutes constitutional. 78 The Court insisted that the state demonstrate that no less
restrictive alternative could satisfy its interests. 7 9 The state could not satisfy this
standard. 18 The Court also found that petition requirements were available as a less
restrictive alternative.'
The court found that petition requirements were available as a less restrictive
alternative.18 2
The Lubin Court applied traditional strict scrutiny analysis because the
California filing fee requirement served as "an absolute, not an alternative, condition
[to candidacy], and failure to meet it is a disqualification from running for
office... [Thus California chose a means] which can operate to exclude some
potentially serious candidates from the ballot without providing them with any
alternative means of coming before the voters."'18 3 Term limits also impose an
absolute condition on candidacy. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, in a concurring
opinion, noted that they would regard a write-in procedure (in addition to a petition
requirement) as an acceptable alternative.'8
d. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party 185 (1979).
Finally, the Illinois State Board of Elections Court also applied traditional
strict scrutiny analysis in a case that struck down a particularly onerous petition
requirement. 86 New political parties and independent candidates for offices of a
political subdivision were required to file petitions with 5 percent as many signatures
as the number of votes cast in the previous election in that subdivision.187 New
parties in Chicago under this statute were forced to submit petitions with 35,947
signatures to get on the city ballot, while to be placed on the statewide ballot they
only needed to obtain 25,000 signatures.188 The Court found this untenable. 189
The Illinois State Board of Elections Court recognized that restrictions on
access to the ballot burden "two distinct and fundamental rights, .. ."19 the right to
vote for the candidate of your choice and the right to associate. The Court then noted
that "[w]hen such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that its
"17 d. at 719.
179 Id. at 718.
'soId.
181 Id. at 719.
18 Id. at 718.
1531d.
1I4Id. at 723.
1- 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
16 "Id.
'187d.
I8 1d. at 177.
'Id. at 184.
1901d.
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classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest." '191 The Court found some
state's interests legitimate (interest to keep ballots manageable, and interest in
keeping frivolous candidates off ballot), but stated:
[o]ur previous opinions have also emphasized that "even when pursuing a
legitimate state interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily
restrict constitutionally protected liberty," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,
58-59. ... (1973), and we have required that States adopt the least drastic
means to achieve their ends Lubin v. Panish, supra, 415 U.S. at 716,.... ;
Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at 31-33, 89 .... This requirement is
particularly important where restrictions on access to the ballot are in-
volved. 2
The Court found no reason why the petition requirement in Chicago was
higher than the statewide measure, holding the Chicago petition requirement
unconstitutional. 193
Justice Marshall wrote this opinion. Three concurring opinions, however,
were separately filed in this case. Justice Blackmun, Stevens, and Rehnquist each
filed separate concurrences.194 Rehnquist concurred in the judgment and Stevens
concurred in part of the Marshall opinion and concurred in the judgment. Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, but did not write a separate opinion. This
diversity of views illustrates the uncertain nature of the ballot access area.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
a. Storer v. Brown1 9 (1974).
Storer v. Brown addressed two California statutes. 19 One statute required
independent candidates to be politically disaffiliated (independent) for at least one
year prior to the primary election to which they sought access to the ballot
("disaffiliation statute"). The other statute required that for independent candidates
to get on the ballot, they must file petitions signed by over 5 percent of the voters
who voted in the last state-wide general election ("petition requirement statute"). 11
The Court held that the disaffiliation statute was constitutional because it 1) involved
no discrimination against independent candidates with a history of being
independent,and 2) the state interest in protecting the electoral process from
191 Id. (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 185.
93 Id. at 187.
Se Id. at 188-90.
"
5 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974).
' Id. at 726-27.
197 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1I
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/4
"splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism... 19" was compelling.
While the Storer Court recognized that the right to vote for a candidate of your
choice and the right to associate were infringed, it also held that statutes which serve
compelling state interests survive constitutional review under the first and four-
teenth amendments and under the equal protection clause.19 The Court took an
expansive view of a state's interests in regulating federal elections, deciding:
as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they
are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes. In any event, the States have evolved
comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in
most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the
time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the
registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of
candidates."
The Court also emphasized that the decision that must be made in this area is
a "hardjudgment" and that the "rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional
challenges to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper test for
separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the
"Equal Protection Clause."' °
The states' interests in regulating elections were then found to be compel-
ling.2w Such interests outweighed the additional "qualification" the statute imposed
on candidates by requiring them to be politically independent for at least a year prior
to attempting to get on the primary ballot as an independent.Lm The Storer Court did,
however, remand the question of the constitutionality of the petition requirement
statute back to the district court.204 It directed the district court to determine the
extent to which the petition requirement restricted potential candidates.
The Storer Court explicitly dismissed the claim that these statutes violated the
qualifications clause by imposing additional qualifications upon congressional
candidates.' This is the only Supreme Court ballot access case which directly
addresses the "qualifications" issue since Powell. Term limit supporters highlight
this decision. They contend Storer favors their position on term limits because it
rejects the direct qualifications approach challenge in this context. They also believe
"Id at 736.
'Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
201 Id.
I2 d. at 736.
20Id.
2"Id. at 738.
2 Id. at 746.
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Storer stands for the proposition that the balancing approach is the most appropriate
manner to address measures such as term limits. Term limits in their view will more
likely be upheld under this rubric than under the direct qualifications approach.
The Storer Court departed from the traditional strict scrutiny analysis the
Supreme Court earlier established for ballot access statutes. Storer applies a level
of scrutiny under which the constitutionality of term limits may be upheld.'1 The
Storer Court did not inquire whether the compelling state objectives could be equally
achieved in a less restrictive manner. Justice Brennan pointed to this in his vigorous
dissent, which was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall.2 7 Brennan also
recognized that the majority opinion seemed to withdraw this burden from the
state.' As he stated, "[w]hen state legislation burdens fundamental constitutional
rights, as conceded here, we are not at liberty to speculate that the State might be able
to demonstrate the absence of less burdensome means; the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating this is upon the State."2w
Term limit proponents underscore this seeming burden change. It signifi-
cantly strengthens their constitutional argument. State interests behind term limits
may be achieved by less restrictive means - such as decreasing the benefits of
incumbency, lesser ballot access restrictions, etc. If states have the burden of
showing that no less restrictive alternatives are available, term limits may be found
unconstitutional.
Supporters ignore the fact that ballot access cases deny candidates or parties
access to the printed ballot. Ballot access restrictions do not prohibit the election of
particular candidates. No ballot access restriction bars write-in campaigns that
potentially might elect candidates. Write-in votes, while almost completely ineffec-
tive against major party candidates, may prove effective if organized by an
incumbent of 12 years standing who was denied a place on the printed ballot.
However, this might be a band-aid option even for incumbents. Term limit laws,
though, block the election of certain incumbents regardless of whether he/she
receives write-in votes or is on the printed ballot.
b. American Party of Texas v. White (1974).210
The American Party Court upheld a number of Texas election statutes using
similar analysis to Storer.21' Both decisions were written by Justice White. The
American Party Court analyzed a statute that denied ballot access to any political
party that neither secured 2 percent of the vote in the previous general election nor
206 Id. at 745-46.
' Id. at 761, (Brennan, J. dissenting).20 Id.
o9 Id. at 762.
210 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974).
21 See generally id.
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filed petitions signed by registered voters numbering at least one percent of the votes
cast in that prior election.212 While the Court recognized that voters' right to
associate was burdened, it found the state interests in preserving the integrity of the
electoral process and in avoiding voter confusion on the ballot compelling. 213 These
state interests justified the burden on voters' right to associate. Like Storer,
American Party does not address whether a less restrictive alternative would have
satisfied these interests. A more modest petition requirement, for example, might
have satisfied these interests. 214
3. Ad Hoc Level of Scrutiny
a. Jenness v. Fortson (1971).215
The Jenness Court did not explicate the standard of review it used in finding
Georgia's filing fee and petition requirements constitutional. Georgia required that
all independent candidates for office pay a filing fee and file a petition signed by at
least 5 percent of the number of voters registered in the previous election. As
Lawrence Tribe noted, "[t]he Court made only a cursory mention of voting and
associational rights, and held simply that 'Georgia in no way freezes the status quo,
but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life.'" 2 6 Al-
though it did not indicate what standard of review it employed, it appeared that the
Court subjected the Georgia laws to only minimal scrutiny. '21 7 This decision
directly followed Williams v. Rhodes. The Jenness Court could have utilized the
strict scrutiny analysis adopted in Williams. It simply noted that Georgia's
regulations were substantially less oppressive than the Ohio laws overturned in Wil-
liams.218
b. Clements v. Fashing2 9 (1982).
The Clements Court addressed two Texas election statutes. 220 One statute
made certain Texas officeholders ineligible to run for state legislative seats should
their current term of office overlap the start of the state legislative term to which they
wished to run." This statute barred the candidacy of incumbents. The other statute
2 12 Id. at 780.
2 13 Id.
214 Recognize that the Supreme Court does not consistently analyze what constitutes a "less restrictive
alternative." They may either be less onerous requirements, like a lower petition requirement, or different
alternatives which are easier to satisfy.
215 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
216 Id. at 439.
21
" TiBE, supra note 148, at 1105. Tribe also notes here that the court inJenness "did not inquire whether
a petition requirement lower than 5 percent would have satisfied the state's interests; such inquiry into the
existence of less restricitve alternative has always been deemed an essential aspect of strict scrutiny." 403
U.S. at 431.2 18 d. at 438-42
219 Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
22 d. at 960.
221Id.
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMrTsSummer, 1991]
41
Latz: Congressional Term Limits
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
was a "resign to run" statute. It required particular officeholders wishing to run for
another office to resign if theirunexpired term at that time exceeded one year.m 2 The
Clements Court found both statutes constitutional and upheld them against first
amendment free speech and fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges. 223
A plurality of the Court joined the opinion.
The plurality stated that these statutes infringed upon the right of individuals
to become candidates for elective office.224 It explicitly rejected the proposition that
these statutes restricted one's right to vote for the candidate of one's choice or one's
right to associate originally recognized in ballot access cases in Williams31 The
Clements plurality framed its analysis around this "right to candidacy." The
plurality distinguishes Clements v. Fashing in this manner from the other ballot
access decisions. It establishes a rational relationship test for classifications that
restrict an individuals' right to candidacy. If a legislature's classification is not
rationally related to its purpose, it violates the equal protection clause. As a practical
matter, once courts define the test as rational, states satisfy this standard. The
classification of certain officeholders was found in Clements to be rationally related
to the state interests.? These statutes passed constitutional muster? 27
The Clements Court implicitly rejected the argument that infringement on
one's right to candidacy also infringes upon a voter's right to vote for the candidate
of their choice as well as a voter's right to associate freely to get their parties'
nominee on the ballot.m I believe Clements singular focus on the individual's right
to candidacy is incorrect. These rights are interrelated. The Clements plurality
refused to address voters' interests here by noting that courts may only address the
statute's effects on the litigants, not its potential effect on voters in the officeholder's
district. The Court refused to recognize that litigants are also voters. These statutes
affect the litigants both as candidates and as voters.
By ignoring the interrelationship between voters' rights and the right to
candidacy, the Clements Court establishes a new level of scrutiny for statutes that
restrict a candidate's right to run for office. The Court held that it must examine "the
nature of the interests that are affected and the extent of the burden these provisions
place on candidacy."2 29 The Court then analyzed each statute in question regarding
its alleged violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the
first amendment's free speech clause.
Id.
Id. at 971.
=4Id.
z' Id.
mId. at 965.
=7 Id.
zd. at 972.
2m9 Id. at 966.
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The Clements Court initially noted that the Texas statute mandating a waiting
period for certain officeholders before they may run for another office imposes a "de
minimus burden on the political aspirations of a current officeholder...A 'waiting
period' is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy."230 The Court justified this "de
minimus" burden on candidates with the state's interest in "maintaining the integrity
of the State's Justices of the Peace."23' The Court then dismissed the equal protection
clause challenge on the grounds that the classification imposed a "de minimus"
burden on candidates and the state's interests outweighed it.
The first amendment claim was also dismissed by the Clements Court.232 It
again focused on the restriction imposed upon the candidate's political activity. The
Court refused to acknowledge the alleged violation of the first amendment righ,&sof-
voters who were denied the opportunity to vote for this particular candidate.233 The
Court's exclusive focus on the candidate resulted in the holding that these statutes:
represent a far more limited restriction on political activity than this Court has
upheld with regard to civilservants. See CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
... (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, ... (1973); United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330... (1947). These provisions in no way restrict
appellees' [judges, etc.] ability to participate in the political campaigns of
third parties. They limit neither political contributions nor expenditures.
They do not preclude appellees from holding an office in a political party.
Consistent with [these statutes], appellees may distribute campaign literature
and may make speeches on behalf of a candidate.'M
Justices of the Peace must wait. The state interests justified the wait to exercise his/
her right to be a candidate.
The Clements Court finally dismissed the claim that the "resign to run" statute
was unconstitutional. 235 It found that the burdens imposed by this statute were "even
less substantial" than those imposed by the earlier statute.23 This holding applied
to both the first amendment claim and the equal protection claim.
c. Term Limit Supporters' Constitutional Argument
Term limit supporters rely on Storer and Clements for the constitutional basis
of state-passed congressional term limits. Storer took the direct qualifications
approach and dismissed it. Supporters rely on Storer for the proposition that
md. at 967.
23 Id. at 968.
32 Id. at 971-72.
n3mId.
234 Id. at 972.
2 Mid. at 971.
236 Id.
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minimal qualifications for office will be upheld if the state's interest justify the
additional "qualification." Powell and its progeny in the direct qualifications
approach are rejected by supporters' in this manner.
Supporters believe term limits will be upheld if the level of scrutiny applied
in Storer or Clements is applied to term limits. If these decisions alone provide the
basis for the present Supreme Court's analysis, supporters make a persuasive
argument. Both the Storer Court and the Clements' plurality dismissed voters'
fundamental rights to vote for the candidate of their choice and voters' right to
associate for political means. 237 Storer found states' interests in regulating the ballot
compelling, thus overriding the infringement of these rights.28 Clements' plurality
explicitly dismissed these rights as not being the issue in that case.239 They focused
on one's right to candidacy, which was "de minimusly" burdened by the challenged
statutes. Supporters stress that neither of the Texas statutes imposed significant
burdens on potential candidates. Each was constitutional because it rested on a
rational predicate to the classification scheme. Each survived challenge under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the first amendment's free
speech clause. Supporters, while recognizing the factual difference between this
situation and term limits, contend that this "case establishes the constitutional
analysis for anti-incumbent laws."4
Term limits affect congressional incumbents in the same manner as the Texas
statute that banned certain candidacies until officeholders finished their elective
terms. This is especially true as applied to the Colorado amendment.21 Both
measures ban candidates (or incumbents) from running for a specified period until
certain conditions are met. The precondition in Texas was that the potential
officeholder not hold an office with a concurrent term. 242 The precondition in
Colorado is that the ex-incumbent, who had previously served six consecutive terms
in the House of Representatives or two consecutive terms in the Senate, wait four
years after being barred from office.2413 The "waiting period" is four years after being
kicked out by the term limit law.
Proponents contend this "waiting period" affects the same rights to candidacy
and constitutional issues as those addressed by Clements. The equal protection
clause and free speech clause claims should be dismissed in a similar manner.
Supporters emphasize that term limits (assuming the term limit statute has the
provision that "barred incumbents" may run again after four years) should be subject
to the same constitutional analysis as the statutes upheld in Clements.
'
2 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
23 8Storer, 415 U.S. at 746.
239 457 U.S. at 972.
2o Glazier, Each Stale (Can limit Re-election to Congress, The Wall Street J., June 19,1990, at A20, col. 3.
"
4 Colo. CoNsr. amend V.
242 457 U.S. at 966-67.
' Colo. CONST. Amqai. V.
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Two federal circuit court rulings may also lend force to supporters' contention
that state laws prohibiting long-term incumbents from running do not offend the
equal protection clause, the free speech clause, or the qualifications clauses. These
two cases are analyzed below.
1. Signorelli v. Evans" (2nd Cir. 1980).
The Signorelli court addressed a New York statute that required state judges
to resign their judgeships should they desire to run for a different office, including
Congress.- 5 The federal district court found the statute invalid as unconstitution-
ally adding a qualification to the qualifications clauses.'" The Second Circuit over-
turned, holding per Storer that the statute did not impose a large enough additional
qualification to justify overturning the statute.u? The court emphasized that judges
are free to resign their judicial posts if they want run for Congress.'- It stated that
"New York places no obstacle between Signorelli [the state judge] and the ballot or
his nomination or his election. He is free to run and the people are free to choose
him."-'9 The court recognized the fundamental nature of the right of the voters to
choose their own representatives, but concluded that this statute did not greatly
infringe this right.'-0
The court acknowledged that the statute added the qualification to the
qualifications clauses that a candidate not be a sitting state judge.2' It balanced this,
however, by noting that the state is regulating "a local government subject on which
New York's regulatory authority is plenary.'- 2 The state interest and jurisdiction
justified the "minimal" qualification it upheld. Finally, the Second Circuit also
noted that the United States Constitution restricts particular candidacies for federal
office under the incompatibility clause. 53 "By requiring state judges to resign from
their positions if they seek election to Congress, New York adopts its own
incompatibility principle, protecting the integrity and independence of the judicial
branch from the conflicting activities of seeking and holding Congressional of-
fice."254 These interests outweighed the burden placed on candidates and voters by
forced resignations.
2. Joyner v. Mofford 55 (9th Cir. 1983).
Joyner is also cited in support of the constitutionality of term limits. The
2 4Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1980).
24 Id. at 855.
w6 Id.
2 M. at 862.
2" Id.
249 d. at 858
2- Id. at 862-63.
"2s d. at 863.
2m Id. at 859.
2" Id. See U.S. CoNsr. Art. I, Sec. 6, et. 2.
2 Signorelli, 637 F2d at 861.
Us Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
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Arizona statute challenged inJoyner prohibited salaried elective state officeholders
from running for other offices, including Congress, while retaining their seats.3
The incumbent was forced to resign to run for another office. 7 The Joyner Court
relied substantially on Clements in holding that the statute did not violate the
qualifications clause, the first amendment's free speech clause, or the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2S8 The court, in passing on the
statute's constitutionality vis-a-vis the qualifications clause, distinguished between
two types of state provisions. The court initially noted that "state provisions which
bar a potential candidate from running from federal office... [impose] additional
qualifications on candidates and therefore violate the qualifications clause...."259
However, state provisions which "merely regulate the conduct of state officehold-
ers" are "constitutionally acceptable since [they]... merely bar state officeholders
from remaining in their positions should they choose to run for federal office." The
resign to run statute in question was held constitutional for it merely required current
officeholders to resign. It did not bar them from office." s
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the first amendment and equal protection claims
by relying on Clements and Signorelli. The Ninth Circuit did note, however, that
its statute was more inclusive of officeholders than either of the statutes in Signorelli
or Clements. 2 However, the Ninth Circuit found the Arizona statute constitutional
because it fell within the parameters set out under the state regulation clause. 3
Supporters may also view ballot access cases as prime examples of courts
guarding the flexibility and fluidity of American governmental institutions. By
broadening access to the ballot and keeping states from effectively barring third
parties and independent candidates from elective office, courts attempt to retain real
choice for the electorate on the ballot. By giving these candidates the opportunity
to get on the ballot, and then to be elected, courts struggle to increase the choices
available to the public. However, if courts are convinced that the principle they have
been upholding (real and broad choice among candidates for voters) with the ballot
access decisions is a farce, courts may invent a new structure under which to analyze
cases where the choice is not "real". Term limit supporters contend no real choice
exists in a political system that reelects incumbents at such high rates. Courts may
adopt this rationale and justify term limits as returning to the voters "real choice".
d. Responses to term limit supporters constitutionality arguments
The cases and principles on which term limit supporters base their arguments
2" Id. at 1525.
__ Officeholders were also allowed to run under this Arizona statute if they were serving in the last year of
their term.
253 Id. at 1531-33.
2"9 Id. at 1528.
2W Id.
261 Id. at 1530-31.
=Id.
2Id. at 1532, 1533.
[Vol. 25:1AKRON LAW REVEEW
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/4
do not provide compelling factors for the constitionality of state-passed congres-
sional term limits. Storer, Signorelli, and Joyner's holdings have limited value
when applied to the term limit context. Clements has been significantly undermined
by more recent Supreme Court decisions in the ballot access area. However, if the
current Supreme Court singularly focuses on the analysis found in these decisions,
especially Clements, term limits might be deemed constitutional.'
The Clements plurality focused on the infringed right to candidacy. Their
analysis and level of scrutiny for ballot access cases, however, was replaced in
Anderson v. Celebrezze.2 " Anderson employed the more traditional focus on the
infringement upon voters' right to vote for the candidate of their choice and their
freedom to associate. Anderson's rejection of the right of candidacy analysis is
consistent with the debates in the Constitutional Convention. Both recognize the
interrelationship between the rights as well as the fundamental nature of the rights
involved.
Term limits also impose greater burdens on the rights of candidates -than did
the Texas statutes upheld in Clements. Even if Clements' analysis holds, the
minimum burden on incumbent members of Congress barred from office after 12
years under the Colorado term limit law is a mandatory four year wait. In Texas, no
wait was required under the "resign to run" statute. Any time an incumbent state
officeholder wished to run for Congress or any other office, he/she was simply
required to resign.
Under the "ineligible to run until the legislative term ends" statute, the
maximum period that a Justice of the Peace could be forced to wait is two years, one-
half the period required by the Colorado term limit law. The Texas "waiting period"
was justified by Texas' interests in "maintaining the integrity of its Justices of the
Peace by ensuring that they will neither abuse their position nor neglect their duties
because of aspirations for higher office." 2  Term limits do not impact this state
interest. The Clements plurality's emphasis on the specific applicability of their
analysis to Justices of the Peace and the unique role such justices play in our system
of government limits its holding.
Finally, one Texas statute in Clements as well as the challenged statute in
Signorelli were ballot access statutes. Ballot access statutes do not bar candidates
' An analysis of the current Supreme Court's views in the ballot access area is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, note that then Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice) wrote the plurality opinion in
Clements, which was joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, with Justice White joining Part I of the dissent. Justice Steven concurred
in part and in the judgment. The strict scrutiny ballot access approach was taken by Justices Brennan and
Marshall in lllinois State Board of Elections. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in Anderson
v. Celebrezze. See infra text at 41, which undermines Clements' focus on the right to candidacy. Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Anderson, in which he was joined by Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor.
Finally, Justice White delivered the opinion in Storer and American Party of Texas.
2s 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See infra text at 41 for extensive analysis of Anderson.
I Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 959.
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from election. They simply bar candidates' names from placement on printed
ballots. Enough write-in votes may elect an officeholder denied a place on the ballot.
Term limit laws completely bar incumbents from election, not access to the printed
ballot.
The Signorelli and Joyner circuit court decisions made abundantly clear that
their holdings were premised on resign to run statutes that did not bar anyone's
candidacy or election. Potential candidates were forced to resign in order to run for
Congress. The Second Circuit in Signorelli recognized that
New York's scheme.. .confronts the prospective candidate with a choice: he
may run for Congress if he is willing to resign his judgeship.... New York
places no obstacle between Signorelli and the ballot or his nomination or his
election. He is free to run and the people are free to choose him.'
The Second Circuit distinguished the New York statute it upheld from previous New
York laws that barred judges from running during the term for which he/she was
elected. Those laws were deemed unconstitutional "for imposing additional
qualifications for nomination or election to Congress in violation of the " [qualifica-
tions] Clause."" They were invalid because a prohibition on a "[c]ongressional
candidacy during the term of a person's judicial or other office limits directly and,
for a period of time, absolutely the choice of the electorate."m Term limits
absolutely bar incumbents from office. They do not give incumbents the choice
provided by resign to run statutes. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Joyner noted that
"[s]tate laws which bar a potential candidate from running for federal office.. .imposes
additional qualifications on candidates and therefore violates the "Qualifications
Clause .... "1270
The Second Circuit in Signorelli also premised its holding on the fact that the
state traditionally exercised "plenary power" over the judicial office, a "local
government subject."27' Term limits affect federal offices for which the U.S.
Constitution explicitly enumerates qualifications. True, states may regulate many
aspects of congressional elections (subject, of course, to congressional override), but
it is not an area over which states have "plenary power."
4. Heightened Rational Basis Review
a. Anderson v. Celebrezze272 (1983).
The Anderson Court devised a new rubric to analyze ballot access cases. In
267 Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d at 858.
269Id.
26 Id.27 0I Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d at 1528.
271 Signorelli v. Evans, 637 § 637 F2d at 859.
27 2Anderson v. Clebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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determining whether an Ohio statute that required candidates for President to file a
statement of candidacy by a particular date (allegedly placing an unconstitutional
burden on the voting and associational rights of the independent candidate's
supporters), the Court stated that it must resolve constitutional challenges to specific
provisions of a State's election laws with a two-part balancing text.
It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the first and fourteenth amendments that the plaintiff seeks
to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after
weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether
the challenged provision is unconstitutional." 3
The Ohio statute was deemed unconstitutional under this approach.274
The Anderson Court abandoned Clements' focus on the infringed right to
candidacy. It recognized that restricting a candidate's right to run for office directly
affects voters' rights to choose whom they wish to represent them and voters' right
to associate for political reasons. 275 The Court noted that while Ohio's early filing
deadline fell upon aspirants for office, the rights infringed are the same as those
recognized in Bullock:
Nevertheless, as we have recognized, 'the rights of voters and the rights
of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.'
(citation omitted)
Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions 'to
limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.' Therefore,'[i]n
approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light
the extent and nature of their impact on voters.'276
The Court further recognized that '[t]he exclusion of candidates also burdens
voters' freedom of association, because an election campaign is an effective platform
for the expression of views on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a
rallying point for like-minded citizens.' 2" Clements' plurality refused to recognize
the interrelationship between these rights.
27 Id. at 790.274 /d. at 806.
275 1d. at 793-94.
276 Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
277 Id. at 788-89 (emphasis added).
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While Anderson does not explicitly overrule Clements,"" it shifts the analysis
in election cases from the rights of candidates to the rights of voters. The resulting
burden Anderson places on term limit supporters is substantial. The candidate is no
longer the focus. Voters' rights must be balanced against the state interests. Voters
in states with term limits are explicitly denied the right to choose longserving
incumbents.
b. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party279 (1986).
The most recent Supreme Court ballot access decision, Munro, upheld a
Washington election statute requiring that minor political party candidates receive
over 1 percent of the vote in the primary in order to be placed on the general election
ballot.280
The Munro Court recognized that the right to vote for the candidate of your
choice andthe rightto associate were implicatedby this statute.21 Itfailed, however,
to afford these rights fundamental status, thus avoiding strictly scrutinizing the
statute. Instead, the Munro Court engaged in alengthy summation ofprevious ballot
access cases, focusing on the types of statutes which did ordidnot pass constitutional
muster.2 2 The Court concluded that the magnitude of the ballot access restrictions
on constitutional rights inMunro were "slight when compared to the restrictions we
upheld in Jenness and American Party."283 The Munro Court further noted that the
general election ballot access restriction was relatively slight because minor parties
had "easy access" to the primary ballot.284 The general/primary election distinction
was significant. The Court dismissed the infringed rightto associate and right to vote
for the candidate of your choice by noting that minor parties' candidates could
exercise these rights during the primary election. 8 5
5. Conclusion on Ballot Access Level of Scrutiny
Despite the tortured and often contradictory approaches the Supreme Court
2"' The Anderson Court, in Footnote 9, however, notes that "We have also upheld restrictions on candidate
eligibility that serve legitimate state goals which are unrelated to First Amendment values. See Clements
v. Fashing, [1025 Ct. 2836]" This seems to contradict the Court's holding. In addition, restrictions on
candidate eligibility can never be completely unrelated to First Amendment values. True, they may
implicate such values to lesser degrees, however, the Court did not state this.
The Anderson Court also changed the focus of the inquiry. Finally, three of the five justices in the
Anderson majority dissented in Clements. This further lends doubt to the relevance of Footnote 9.
279 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
2S Id. at 191.
28 Justices Marshall and Brennan, in dissent, gave these interests fundamental status. They stated that the
interests violated were fundamental and triggered strict scrutiny. Since the statute did not survive strict
scrutiny, they would have found it unconstitutional.
232 Id. at 193-98.
2 Id. at 199.
2"Id. at 194.
u3 Id. at 199.
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has taken in the ballot access area, it is clear that, regardless of the level of scrutiny
imposed, severe restrictions on ballot access (like those found in Williams v. Rhodes,
Bullock v. Carter, Lubin v. Panish, Illinois Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, Anderson v. Celebrezze) will be overturned, while minimal restrictions (like
those found in Jenness v. Fortson, Storer v. Brown, American Party of Texas V.
White, Clements v. Fashing, Munro v. Socialist Workers Party) will be constitu-
tional. As Professor Tribe notes,
the principle to be distilled from the Court's approach [is that] in order to keep
ballots manageable and protect the integrity of the electoral process, states
may condition access to the ballot upon the demonstration of a significant,
measurable quantum of community support,- 6 but cannot require so large or
so early a demonstration of support that minority parties or independent
candidates have no real chance of obtaining ballot positions.27
The ballot access area is fraught with confusing and contradictory Supreme
Court decisions spanning the last 20 years. No single standard or level of scrutiny
has been provided by the Supreme Court to guide lower courts faced with ballot
access issues raised by state regulation. Each circuit seems to have developed its own
precedents and viewed the Supreme Court's ballot access decisions with frustration.
The extent to which the Supreme Court's ballot access analysis serves as a guide to
addressing term limits may not be significant. However, this line of cases provides
the best framework for examining the interests and rights infringed by term limits.
Term limits will likely be challenged as unconstitutionally adding "qualifications"
as well as violating both the first amendment' free speech clause and the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. These specific challenges and my conclu-
sions on these issues will be examined.
C. Are term limits an additional "qualification'?
Whether courts approach term limits using the direct qualifications approach
or one of the court's "balancing" approaches, courts should determine whether term
limits constitute additional "qualifications." The crux of the issue is the extent to
which term limits restrict the opportunity and rights of candidates and voters. These
must be balanced against the state or nation's interests in justifying term limits.
Ultimately, the policy arguments for and against term limits provide the
crucial playground for the courts. Such policy arguments include: the reelection rate
versus percentage turnover in Congress; The right of voters to choose to restrict their
choices versus the right of voters to freely choose their representatives; The 22nd
amendment versus voters' right to associate; Fresh blood, new ideas and the demise
of the seniority system versus forced loss of expertise and experience in an age of
" L. Tribe, Supra note 148 at 1110-11, citing American Party, 415 U.S. at 782.
"L Tribe, supra nore 148 at 1111.
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complex government; Interest group money in elections and disproportionate influ-
ence in the system versus interest groups representing disenfranchised societal
interests; Reinvigorated political parties versus more powerful unelected lobbyists
and legislative staff; Parochial constituent focus versus responsiveness to the
electorate; Increased national policy focus versus original intent for the U.S. House
of Representatives to be locally responsive; Increased national policy focus versus
original intent for the U.S. House of Representatives to be locally responsive;
Increased bureaucratic responsiveness to the President versus the Presidency as
already holding too much power; and, state-passed term limits versus nationally-
imposed term limits.
I began this paper by examining these arguments. In Part IV, I place these
arguments in the context of the court holdings impacting upon this issue. Much
depends on the makeup of the court. However, the policy arguments and analysis
of the court's precedents remain despite the everchanging nature of the courts.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
A. Unconstitutional under the Direct Qualifications Approach
State-passed congressional term limitations should be deemed unconstitu-
tional under the qualifications clauses in the Constitution as constituting an addi-
tional "qualification" per Powell. The language in the Constitutional Convention
reviewed in Powell is definitive regarding the fundamental nature of the right of
voters to choose their own representatives. James Madison and other Framers time
and again emphasized the fundamental nature of this right and the dangers that
follow significant restrictions on it. Term limits substantially restrict voters' right
to choose whom they want to represent them. True, the Supreme Court has chipped
away at the fundamental nature of the right to vote in ballot access cases. However,
the Court has never been faced with a case that substantially restricts this right. The
ballot access cases were brought by small parties or independent candidates who
were denied a spot on the ballot. Write-in candidacies were possible. No ballot
access case absolutely barred candidates from office for four years. The Colorado
term limit does just this. It is an additional qualification, and it should be deemed
unconstitutional as a result.
B. Unconstitutional under Various Balancing Approaches
State-passed congressional term limits should be deemed unconstitutional
regardless of which "balancing test" the courts adopt. They violate the first
amendment's free speech clause and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. This is true in large part because term limit supporters are forced to rely on
decisions (Storer, Clements, Signorelli, and Joyner) that are either inconsistent as
applied to term limits or substantially restricted by recent Supreme Court decisions.
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The United States Supreme Court has never faced an issue that so significantly
restricts voters' freedom to choose their own representatives. The Colorado term
limit measure absolutely bars the election (not only the candidacy) of incumbents
who have served either six consecutive terms in the U.S. House of Representatives
or two consecutive terms in the U.S. Senate. While candidates previously barred
may run again after four years, voters' choice in the interim have been seriously
limited. This restriction is far greater than any imposed in ballot access cases where
the Supreme Court held the restrictions constitutional.
Supporters admit term limits are drastic. They contend the states' interests in
fair elections and providing voters with "real" choices, however, make this neces-
sary. They point to reelection rates as evidence that there is no real choice present
in today's electoral system. This lack of choice presents far greater dangers to the
system than a temporary limitation of the voters' right to choose. I believe that the
clear restriction on voters' right to choose overrides supporters' assertion that there
is no real choice in congressional elections. Voters fundamental choices should not
be arbitrarily restricted by any type of term limits. This holds true especially for
states individually attempting to restrict the number of terms their congressional
representatives may serve.
Granting individual states the power to enact separate Congressional term
limitation laws presents dangers to our federal democratic system. If each state sets
different length term limits for their respective congressional representatives,
Congress would become an institution where members' tenure depends on the state
from which they are elected. This drastically alters the amount of influence each
state's delegation will exercise in Congress. States mandating fewer terms in
Congress will have less power than states imposing no limits. States fixing a two
term limit effectively deny their members the opportunity for leadership positions
in the House ofRepresentatives. A similar phenomena would occur in the Senate
if a state were allowed to mandate single terms for its senators. This state's Senators
would never be chosen as committee chairpersons. The seniority system has been
checked, not eliminated. If states pass different length term limits, experienced
legislators from states with lower term limits will have even greater influence than
they currently wield.
True, particular states' representatives currently exercise different degrees of
power. States' populations and resulting size of their delegations mandate this.
However, our Founding Fathers established our system of government to give
populous states like New York a greater voice in the House of Representatives.
Power differentials created by different length term limits in various states, however,
would be arbitrary. This poses a danger to our present system of government. Our
Founding Fathers intended to vest the Constitution alone with the exclusive power
to set qualifications for members of Congress. This is one reason for resting this
power at the federal level.
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The Supreme Court should end the confusion in this area and clearly hold that
restrictions on voters' rights to choose the candidate of their choice and voters' right
to associate are fundamental and trigger traditional strict scrutiny as originally
established in Williams v. Rhodes, Bullock v. Carter, Lubin v. Parish, and, most
recently, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party. If these
fundamental rights are to be restricted, one should only be able to accomplish this
by amending the Constitution.
1. Traditional Strict Scrutiny
Term limits infringe the rights of voters to choose whom they wish to elect as
a representative and also infringes upon their right to freely associate and choose
candidates to represent their political party. They restrict these rights by classifying
and barring from office incumbent members of Congress who have served a
specified number of consecutive terms. These rights are fundamental, andhavebeen
recognized as such ever since the Constitutional Convention. While in some
contexts the Supreme Court has upheld minimal infringements upon these rights, the
absolute bar that term limits impose upon incumbents elected by their constituents
for six consecutive terms (in Colorado) warrants fundamental classification of these
rights. These incumbents are not denied access to the printed ballot. They are
disqualified from assuming office even if they win a majority of votes with a write-
in campaign.
States provide no compelling rationale for term limits. If a compelling reason
were recognized, as in Storer or American Party, the Court would next have to
examine the possibility of less restrictive alternatives. However, while congres-
sional reelection rates are extremely high, this does not signal a fatal flaw in our
system of representative democracy nor does it provide a compelling reason for term
limits. True, it is evidence of a major problem in our campaign election law, but
the fact remains that constituents time and again are given choices on the ballot, and
they should have the opportunity to freely exercise that choice to elect their
representatives in Congress. Some argue that voters wantto restricttheir choice with
term limits. People have the right to choose to restrict their own choices. A majority
does support term limits, but the majority in passing term limit laws restrict the
choices available to the minority who oppose such laws. All voters should have the
most unrestricted opportunity to choose their representatives. The majority in favor
of term limits may exercise their voting rights andvote againsttheir incumbents. We
should not, however, give them the right to restrict other voters' choices. None of
the supporters' policy arguments for term limits provide a compelling rationale.
Even if courts find the state interest in a "real" choice compelling, less
restrictive alternatives are available to accomplish this end. If the state's compelling
interest is evidenced by high reelection rates, the solution being more real choice for
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the electorate, there are a number of congressional campaign election reform efforts
under congressional consideration that may make the choice more "real." Political
scientists enumerate many options whose purpose is to make congressional elections
more "fair" to the challengers, thereby reducing the likelihood that incumbents will
be reelected. These include limiting the franking privilege, instituting public
financing of congressional elections, placing an optional cap on spending should
candidates accept public funding (like in the presidential system), mandating free
TV time for debates or ads by candidates, and many others. Each of these campaign
reform measures is less restrictive to candidates than the absolute bar that term limits
impose. Each is aimed at giving the electorate a more "real" choice. Notwithstand-
ing any further arguments, this argument alone is strong enough to constitutionally
overcome any form of term limits.
States may also restrict longserving incumbents access to the printed ballot.
Limiting ballot access is less restrictive than barring such incumbents from office.
This wouldmakeit farmore difficult forincumbents tobe elected as they would need
to organize massive write-in campaigns to win. Practically speaking, this is
extremely difficult. So difficult, in fact, that a court may find such restrictions on
ballot access to effectively bar longserving incumbents from office. However, this
would be less restrictive than the total bar instituted in Colorado. A state may also
bar incumbent members of Congress from one election, not two, as the Colorado
term limit measure mandates.
If the Supreme Court adopts the traditional strict scrutiny approach to term
limits, as I believe it should, it will find an infringement of fundamental rights, state
interests that are not compelling, and the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
Voters will thus retain the freedom to vote out their incumbents if they dislike how
they are being represented in Washington, D.C. They should have this right.
2. Anderson/Munro Approach: Balance the Interests
It is likely, however, that the Supreme Court will continue to confuse lower
courts in the ballot access area and draw parallels between decisions that most view
as contradictory. If the Supreme Court does not recognize the infringed rights as
fundamental and analyzes term limits in a less rigorous fashion than traditional strict
scrutiny it will most likely adopt a variation of the Anderson/Munro analysis. The
Court will weigh the interests on both sides and compare them to previous ballot
access restrictions addressed by the courts. I believe Term limits even under this
approach will still be held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the first amendment's free speech clause.
Clements presents few problems with its focus on the right to candidacy. It's
relevance to term limits is minimal. Anderson and Munro refused to adopt
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Clements' approach. It was a plurality decision. The majority of the Court did not
endorse its novel analysis of focusing exclusively on the rights of candidates. 8
Voters' rights to choose those candidates and the right of political parties to caucus
and freely decide to nominate those candidates were ignored.? 9 Anderson and
Munro recognized that ballot access cases impact these rights.29° Finally, barring an
incumbent lawmaker who has been chosen by his constituents to be their U.S.
Representative in six straight elections over a span of 12 years (two elections for 12
years if a U.S. Senator) from running for reelection for four years is quite different
from restricting a Justice of the Peace from running for the Texas legislature until
his term runs out.
Term limits by definition affect incumbents who have a history of being
chosen by the voters. Longserving incumbents demonstrated enough previous
support to be reelected over the span of many years. It is precisely because they are
so "popular" that term limits restrict their right to run and subsequently voters' right
to choose them to represent their districts. The vagaries of the American electorate
leads to this seemingly contradictory situation. While Americans overall support
term limits, most American would only like to apply them to other voters' members
of Congress. This is one reason the reelection rate to Congress is so high. Whatever
the problem in Washington, D.C., and the public believes Washington is fraught
with "crooked" politicians and problems, it is always the other guys' representatives,
not their own. "Ours" are "the best." As Mark Liedl of The Heritage Foundation
reports, "[a] national survey two days before the election [in 1990] showed that while
69 percent of the public disapproved of Congress, 51 percent approved of their own
congressman."2 91 Hence the popularity of incumbents and term limits.
Proponents contend that term limits are necessary due to the dire state of our
representative democracy. They believe the courts must weigh the nation's interest
in a functioning representative democracy against the voters' right to associate and
their right to choose their own representatives. Our country needs to broaden the
opportunity to serve among the public. The nation's and the states' interests should
prevail. The voters' interests are the same as in ballot access cases, but the states'
and the nation's interests are far greater than keeping ballots manageable and
protecting the integrity of the electoral process. At stake is the nature of our system
of representative govemment. As the Colorado constitution now reads, term limits
are needed to "broaden the opportunities for public service and to assure that
members of the United States Congress from Colorado are representative of and
responsive to Colorado citizens."292 This measure is constitutional as an additional
state regulation of federal elections. It is necessary to preserve our system of
representative govemment.
2
" L TMBE, supra note 148, at 1111.
29 Id. at 1109.2
" Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1982), Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
291 Iledi, supra note 26.
' CoLo. CoNsT. amend V.
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The Colorado measure cites broadening opportunities for public service and
assuring that Colorado's members of Congress are representative of and responsive
to its citizens as its states' interests.29 Colorado's voters passed the measure, feeling
that these interests were not being met by longserving incumbents. However,
opponents argue it is precisely because Congressmen are so responsive to their
constituent's concerns that they get reelected at astonishing rates. Members of the
U.S. House of Representatives must run for reelection every two years. This ensures
responsiveness to the electorate.
Term limit supporters respond that current elections do not reflect responsive-
ness. The reelection rate reflects the enormous institutional advantages incumbents
exercise over challengers. Fundraising advantages, pork barrel projects bringing
jobs to constituents, and the franking privilege all operate to take "real" choice out
of our elections. Much of this is true. However, these are double-edged swords.
Keeping in touch with constituents and bringing them jobs is viewed by some as the
essence of responsiveness. Too many "good things", however, make incumbents so
popular that challengers challenge in name only. Campaign election reform
provides the solution. Many campaign reform efforts do not infringe on voters' or
candidates' "fundamental" rights.
True, incumbents may not voluntarily vote away built-in advantages. How-
ever, if there is enough popular support for campaign reform measures, Congress
will pass them. Ironically, the term limit movement may provide the impetus for
Congress to act. I hope so.
293 Id.
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